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2BINDING ARBITRATION AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE UNDER 
THE FAA:  WILL THIS MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE SURVIVE?
By Kenneth F. Dunham, J.D., LL.M, Associate Professor of Law
ADR Director
Faulkner University’s Thomas Goode Jones School of Law
INTRODUCTION:
A homeowner purchased a condominium at an auction and encountered 
numerous problems.  The homeowner’s problems with the auction company 
could not be resolved, and the homeowner sued the auction company for 
negligence and fraud.  The auction company moved the court to stay the 
lawsuit and compel arbitration under an agreement between the auction 
company and the condominium homeowner’s association.1  A car buyer 
brought a lawsuit against a car dealer for suppression and misrepresentation.  
The sales contract contained an arbitration agreement, and the car dealer 
moved the court to compel arbitration.2  A Delaware general contractor 
subcontracted a roofing project to a Tennessee roofing contractor for a 
project in Alabama.  When a problem with payment arose, the general 
contractor sued the owner of the property where the work was performed, 
and the owner moved the court to compel arbitration.3 A few decades ago 
arbitration agreements were common in construction contracts, labor 
1 National Auction Group, Inc. v. Hammett, 854 So. 2d 65 (2003).
2 Parkway Dodge v. Hawkins, 854 So. 2d 1129 (2003).
3 Huntsville Utilities v. Consolidated Construction Company, 2003 WL 21 205396.
3contracts and in some commercial sales contracts,4 but it seems they are 
appearing everywhere these days.  
Arbitration is one of a group of conflict resolution processes known as 
alternative dispute resolution, or ADR.  The word “alternative” connotes 
they are used as alternatives to the public dispute resolution forum known as 
the court system.  Although some would argue there is little need for 
alternatives to the public justice system, and that some of these alternatives 
might actually be harmful, their utilization has increased dramatically in the 
past three decades.5  The use of ADR has been blamed on the litigation 
explosion, although some scholars have questioned the extent and intensity 
of the “explosion”.6  Although there is evidence to suggest lawsuit filings 
have increased dramatically since the 1960’s, the use of ADR processes may 
be more reflective of dissatisfaction with the court system than a litigation 
“explosion.”
The American legal system is a good system, but it is far from perfect.  
The U.S. court system is neither cost efficient nor time efficient.  Each 
4 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Company, 460 U.S. 1 (1983) Local 174, Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour Company, 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
5 Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) Professor Fiss argues that the dispute 
resolution process which best meets society’s needs is the public system.
6 Arthur Miller, Maybe the Light at the end of the tunnel is the Litigation Explosion, IMPLODING 
DEFENSE COUNSEL JOURNAL (July 1994).  Professor Miller points out that the initial predictions 
about the litigation explosion may have been a bit over-stated.  The congested court system, tort reform 
and new court rules may have slowed down the “explosion,” but the court system still has high costs and 
lots of delays.
4passing year has brought more rules, more fees, more costs and more delays 
to a system already infamous for such things.  The legal system has become 
like Professor Randy Harris’ restaurant analogy.7  If a person has always 
dined at the same restaurant because it had good food at reasonable prices, 
how long will that person continue to dine at the restaurant if the quality of 
the food and service go down and the prices go up?  How long will that 
person continue to eat lousy food served by slow waiters at high prices 
before they consider other alternatives such as fast food restaurants?  People 
who are fed up with the legal system are more receptive to trying ADR to 
resolve their conflicts.
    For nearly two hundred years, “binding arbitration” was an oxymoron in 
American law; because United States courts refused to enforce binding 
arbitration agreements.  American courts followed the English common law 
view that binding pre-dispute arbitration was unenforceable.  However, in a 
series of federal court decisions over the past thirty years, the federal 
judiciary has established a favorable federal policy toward enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.8  The strong federal policy in favor of enforcement 
of arbitration agreements is a complete about face from the common law 
7 Randy Harris is a professor at Abilene Christian University and uses the restaurant analogy to explain the           
nature of changes.
8 Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
5view of arbitration as a revocable agency agreement.9  A quick review of 
arbitration’s more recent history reveals that this shift in the federal 
judiciary’s view toward arbitration came about as the result of the Federal 
Arbitration Act.10
  Arbitration at common law was a creature of contract, and due to the 
revocability doctrine, arbitration contracts were not enforceable.11  Although 
contract law has governed arbitration agreements for hundreds of years, until 
the passage of the FAA enforcement of agreements to arbitrate rather than 
litigate were treated by the American courts as a legal nullity.12  The Federal 
Arbitration Act combined the rules governing arbitration under contract law 
with the equity enforcement powers of specific performance.  Agreements to 
arbitrate may be enforced under the specific performance mandates of the 
FAA in every court in the land.13  Tying arbitration and specific performance 
together resulted in a previously non-binding process becoming a binding 
process.  Thus, the FAA created a synergy.
Specific performance is an equitable remedy in contracts cases that 
allows a party to a contract to move the court to compel performance by the 
other party of the agreed upon terms in the contract, because money 
9 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
10
 9 U.S.C. 1 et. seq.
11
 Tobey v. County of Bristol, Fed. Case No, 14065, at 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).  This American case re-
dated the English Common law doctrine of revocability.
12
 Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874).
13
 9 U.S.C. 2
6damages would not be an adequate remedy for breach of the agreement.14
The essentia of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, codified at 9 USCA 1, 
et. seq. is specific performance enforcement of the terms of contractual pre-
dispute arbitration agreements.  A motion to compel arbitration under 9 USC 
4 is, in reality, a motion to compel specific performance, because litigation is 
not an adequate remedy.15  Thus, when Congress passed the Federal 
Arbitration Act in an effort to overcome longstanding judicial hostility and 
place contracts to arbitrate upon the same footing as other contracts, 
congress made agreements to arbitrate subject to the specific performance 
remedy.16  Prior to the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act, specific 
performance was not available in arbitration contracts.17
One of the major areas of controversy in arbitration law since the FAA 
was passed has been whether the FAA was intended to be procedural law 
applicable only in federal courts or substantive law applicable in all courts.   
Until more recent times, the FAA was considered to be applicable only in 
federal courts.  Justice Stevens concurring opinion in Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and Justice O’Connor’s dissent touched upon 
this misunderstanding.  Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Allied 
14
 Ruder v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 235 N.Y.S. 2d 191 (1962).
15
 9 U.S.C.A. 1 et. seq.
16
 Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 149 L. Ed. 2d 234 (2001)
17
 Kulnkundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942)
7Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), pointed out that congress 
never intended for the FAA to apply in state courts.  Justice Thomas’ and 
Justice Scalia dissented in Terminex and stated they did not believe the FAA 
applied in state courts.  Legal scholars are also divided on this issue.18
There are numerous scholarly articles about binding pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements.  Practically all major legal publications, including 
law journals and law reviews, have contained at least one article about 
contractual binding arbitration within the past ten years.  Some of the more 
recent articles focus on the advantages and disadvantages of binding pre-
dispute arbitration clauses as they apply to disputes between businesses and 
consumers and binding arbitration agreements in employment contract 
disputes.19  The opposite conclusions reached by the legal scholars who have 
written articles on this subject reveal there is much room for debate by the 
academy in this area of contract law.  
The society of scholars is also sharply divided between two views of 
how the FAA should be applied, neither of which could be labeled as the 
dominant position on contractually binding arbitration.  The more traditional 
18
 Professor David Schwartz of the University of Wisconsin Law School believes that the FAA should only 
apply in Federal courts, while Professor Christopher Drahoyal of the University of Kansas School of Law 
contends Congress intended for the FAA to apply in state courts.  Both professors have articles regarding 
federal preemption under the FAA in the Spring 2004 issue of Dispute Resolution Magazine.
19
 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 149 L.Ed. 2d 234 (2001) The U.S. Supreme Court held that contracts 
of employment are within the reach of the FAA.  The court held the FAA pre-empts contrary state law on 
employment agreements.  The ruling refused to consider the state intrusion agreements of 22 attorneys 
general in their amici briefs field in this case.
8view is that binding contractual arbitration is inseparably yoked to contract 
law and is subject to examination under contract law principles.20  The other 
prevalent view of binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements is that although 
such clauses are subject to legal contract defenses, such clauses should also 
be examined for the fairness of their resulting effect on the contracting 
parties.21  Both views have merit.  Binding arbitration agreements are 
contracts and should be subjected to contract law principles.  However, 
when specific performance of a binding pre-dispute arbitration agreement is 
sought, it must be remembered that the origin of specific performance as a 
remedy is equity and not law.22  Equity principles demand an examination of 
the fairness of the outcome prior to awarding the remedy.23  Colleagues in 
the academy have consistently advocated for either the traditional contract 
interpretation analysis or the resulting fairness effect analysis.  Neither side 
has been able to win the argument, and the debate continues.
This article will not advocate for the traditional analysis or the resulting 
fairness effect analysis, but will endeavor to, provide a reflective 
examination of binding arbitration based upon specific performance 
principles, examine the origins of the arbitration process and the subsequent 
20
 Stephen J. Ware, Paying the price of process, 2001 J. DISP. RES. 89 (2001)
21
 Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway widens doorway to impoing unfair binding arbitration on consumers, FLA. 
BAR JOURNAL, NN. 1999
22
 “Smith’s Remedies Tutorial,” WEST, NET (2004).
23
 P.Tucker, “The Early History of the Court of Chancery:  A comparative study”, ENGLISH 
HISTORICAL REVIEW, Sept. 2000.
9mutations and transformations that has guided its history.  The article will 
show that the binding arbitration process began as an adjunct to the 
adjudication process, and it was within the control of the legal system.  
Binding arbitration was modified over the centuries into a non-binding 
process governed by agency and contract rules in the common law. 
Arbitration was then transformed by statutory law in 1925, into a binding 
process governed by specific performance principles and contract law.  The 
resulting fairness effect analysis adds equity principles to the examination of 
arbitration agreements, and this view challenges not only the effect of 
binding arbitration upon the contracting parties contractual rights but also 
the impact of such clauses upon the parties constitutional rights.24
Numerous articles have been published about the effects of binding 
consumer arbitration on constitutional rights.  Legal scholars are troubled by 
the access to justice and procedural problems associated with consumer 
arbitration.25 Some scholars have gone so far as to declare consumers 
24
 Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens Door to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers, 71 
NOV. FL. B.J. 8 (1997).
25
 Richard C. Reuben, First options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Reparability:  Restoring 
Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. 819, 829-888 (2003)
Some of the major problems associated with binding arbitration are the possibilities of gross 
substantive and procedural injustices due to the absence of legal standards, capricious awards and 
uncorrectable awards, and incentives to favor repeat players over one time players.  The assent of the 
parties to arbitration and denial of their access to the judicial system has become a major issue in the 
arbitration controversy.  Professor Reuben discusses the procedures courts use to determine whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate, including the so-called separability doctrine, and concludes it has the 
appearance of a shell game.  Arbitrators are allowed to decide fraud issues and other matters normally 
reserved for the courts.  Professor Reuben discusses the tension between First Options of Chicago v. 
Kaplan and Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co.  The First Options case held that courts, 
10
“victims” of the arbitration process.26 Other scholars have suggested revising 
the arbitration process, and taking steps to make arbitration a fair process for 
all who are involved in it.27 A variety of unique issues exist with regard to 
specific performance of arbitration agreements in consumer cases, and the 
not arbitrators, are to decide whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate based upon actual, rather than 
implied assent. Prima Paint held that the arbitration clause should be treated as a separate contract from 
its container contract, and it may be held valid even if the container contract is held invalid.  Professor 
Reuben also contrasts the basic tension between freedom to contract versus the rule of law.  The former 
view favors arbitration, while the later favors the preservation of judicial access.  Professor Reuben also 
discusses the French doctrine of competence-competence regarding the arbitrator’s independent authority 
to decide issues, and uses substantive arbitrability versus procedural arbitrability to explain the concept.  
The courts decide substantive arbitrability (was there an agreement to arbitrate?), and the arbitrator 
decides procedural arbitrability (conditions necessary to trigger a duty to arbitrate).  The view of federal 
courts that arbitrator’s rule on.  The issues after the courts rule there is an agreement to arbitrate places 
non-lawyer arbitrators in the awkward position of endeavoring to analyze legal defenses such as fraud.  
In some instances, not only are the parties denied their day in court, they are also denied their legal 
defenses to the contract.  Professor Reuben concludes that the courts should move toward actual consent 
to arbitrate, rather than implied consent to arbitrate under the separability doctrine.
26
 Richard B. Cappalli, Arbitration of Consumer Claims:  The Sad Case of Two-Time Victim Terry Johnson 
or Where Have You Gone Learned Hand?,  BOSTON PUBLIC INTERST LAW JOURNAL 367-376 
Summer 2001
Cappalli cites a dismissal of a class action and order to arbitration as an example of sellers and lenders 
avoiding legislation protecting consumers by the insertion of binding arbitration agreements into 
adhesion contracts.  He also cites the court’s endeavor to lessen their own workloads by compelling cases 
to arbitration on almost any ground available.  Cappalli describes the “powerful presumption” in federal 
courts favoring arbitration as a “heavy burden” on consumer protection challenges.  He describes 
“insurmountable barriers” as a game the consumer cannot win.  Cappalli points out that the U.S. Supreme 
Court ahs fashioned a liberal policy favoring arbitration from the FAA, a statute which actually states to 
treat arbitration agreements no differently from any other contract.  He accuses the courts of using any 
excuse to shift litigation out of the system due to the heavy docket pressure.  In an interesting analogy 
Cappali describes the U.S. Supreme Courts “doctrine” concerning arbitration as “the-elbow-on-the-scale 
boost to arbitration.”  Cappalli points out hat the consumer plaintiffs cannot get the same relief from an 
arbitral panel that is available in a court, due to big business being able to eliminate class actions through 
arbitration.
27
 Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine:  The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory 
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1040-1047 (1998)
Federal policy favors arbitral dispute resolution in response to overcrowded dockets, but the extent 
of favoritism granted to arbitration is a major departure from previous practice and the early 
interpretations of the FAA.  The individual state no longer has the power to regulate arbitration 
agreements due to the federal policy favoring arbitration.  Adhesive contracts of employment containing 
arbitration clauses are being used to determine employee statutory rights.  The logic behind the federal 
courts interpretation of the FAA rests on two assumptions:  Arbitration is different but not inferior to 
courts, and that parties should be allowed to judge their own best interest.  In Allied Bruce Terminex v. 
Dobson, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the arguments of 20 state attorney’s general against extending 
the reach of the FAA.  In Doctors Associates v. Casarotto the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Mortano’s 
requirement that the notice of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a contract be in bold letters.  States 
are not allowed to police the fairness of an arbitration agreement due to preemption by the FAA.
11
available literature reveals some of these issues are access to justice, access 
to process, legality of the award and limitations on judicial review.28
Some scholars suggest that specific performance of arbitration 
agreements under the FAA should not be permitted for statutory claims 
affecting the parties rights, but it appears that the federal courts have little 
interest in creating an escape route for such claims.29 The United States 
Supreme Court and the federal judiciary continue to issue opinions favoring 
specific performance of arbitration contracts as an alternative forum to 
litigation. The federal judiciary apparently believes that the positives of 
binding arbitration outweigh any negatives attached to this process. A brief 
history of the arbitration process, specific performance and the evolution of 
arbitration case law provide a necessary foundation for an in-depth 
examination of the existing controversy.  The foundation being laid, this 
article will then discuss the synergism of contract law and equity which 
gives the FAA its power, the applicable equity Maxims and defenses to 
arbitration clauses.  Resistive efforts by states and consumer groups to the 
arbitration process including varied perspectives will be discussed.  The 
28
 See Reuben, Supra FN 25.
29
 Joseph A. Arnold, The Circumvention of Compulsory Arbitration:  Two Bites at the Apple, or a 
Restoration of Employees’ Statutory Rights:,  33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1207 (2003).
This article argues of a choice by employees to refuse to sign an arbitration agreement without being 
forced to forego employment.  The Supreme Court in EEOC v. Waffle House affirmed the EEOC’s 
ability to proceed independent of the employee’s agreement to arbitrate, but this case offers little to 
protection to employees individually.  This article argues for the employee’s right to enter into a mutual 
agreement rather than a unilateral waiver of rights in a “take it or leave it” employment agreement.
12
reality of the process compared to the theory of the process will also be 
discussed. 
HISTORY OF ARBITRATION: 
The recorded history of arbitration began with a busy judge spending 
his days resolving people’s problems by hearing cases from early in the 
morning until late at night.  The judge’s father-in-Law saw the chaotic 
situation and asked the judge, “Why are you doing this all by yourself?”  
The judge responded that people have many problems, and when problems 
arise people come to him for resolution.  The father-in-law said, “This is no 
way to go about it.  You will burn out.”  The father-in-law suggested that the 
judge select some competent, incorruptible people of integrity to act as 
private judges of the people’s problems. The big cases could still be 
presented to the judge, but the everyday business problems would be 
decided by these private judges acting as arbiters.  The judge took his father-
in-law’s advice and appointed a group of competent people to decide the 
people’s everyday problems.  The arbiters judged the routine cases, but the 
hard cases were still heard by the public judge. This was the first recorded 
implementation of an arbitration process.30
30
 EUGENE H. PETERSON, The Message, p. 135, 136 NAVE PRESS PUBLISHING GROUP, Colorado 
Springs, 1995.
13
The above conversation did not take place in the chambers of a famous
jurist.  It took place in a wilderness area east of Egypt around 1250 
B.C.31 The public judge was Moses, the leader of the Jewish exodus from 
Egypt, and his father-in-law Jethro was an Arab priest.  The conversation 
between them, which gave rise to the first recorded use of the binding 
arbitration process, is recorded in the Bible in the eighteenth chapter of the 
book of Exodus.  The quoted words of Jethro are taken from The Message,32
a contemporary language version of the Bible.  It is not known if Jethro 
invented the idea of binding arbitration or if it was a familiar process used in 
the ancient Middle Eastern world.  Both Jethro and Moses seemed familiar 
with the process, and their familiarity could indicate the process was already 
an acceptable form of dispute resolution in Egypt and Arabia.  The book 
containing the exchange between Moses and Jethro was written over thirty 
centuries ago, making it by far the oldest known reference to the use of 
binding arbitration.33
When courts and dispute resolution professionals refer to arbitration as 
an alternative forum to litigation, it creates a presumption that jury trials 
preceded arbitration.  Contrary to the assumptions being made about 
The book of Exodus in the Bible contains the first known reference to binding arbitration.  Moses led   
the Jews out of Egypt around 1250 B.C. over 3,200 years ago.  The nation of Israel numbered in the 
millions, and problems were abundant within this massive company of people.
31
 THE MASTER BIBLE, J. Wesley Dickson & Co. Indianapolis, 1957, P. 1730.
32
 See PETERSON Supra, FN 30.
33
 See MASTER BIBLE, Supra FN 31.
14
arbitration by its opponents, arbitration was not invented as an alternative to 
the jury trial, because the arbitration process pre-dates the jury trial by at 
least a thousand years.34  The theory behind arbitration has always been to 
speed up the dispute resolution process while unburdening the public justice 
system.  In the days of Moses the public justice system was backlogged with 
cases, and Moses, the only public judge who heard those cases, was 
overworked.35 The process resulted in justice being dispensed at a painfully 
slow pace by a burned out judge.  The arbitrators suggested by Jethro sped 
up the process and relieved Moses of the incredible burden of hearing every 
case arising in a group of people who in number could match the population 
of a major U.S. city.36  The arbitrators freed Moses to decide the tough cases, 
which could not be arbitrated and allowed him to conduct other important 
business.  The argument of the modern advocates for arbitration is 
essentially the same argument used to justify arbitration in Moses day.37
34
 William A. Forsyth, History of Trial By Jury Frederick D. Linnad Company, JERSEU CITY (1875).
No one seems to know just when the jury trial originated.  In England it seems to have been traced to 
the Anglo-Saxon times, but others argue about it was a product of the ancient courts of Teutonic nations.  
Although there is some evidence that the Scandinavians may have enjoyed the benefits of the jury trial as 
early as 750 A.D., the earliest clues pointing to a jury trial originate in ancient Rome.  There is a popular 
legend that the Romans borrowed the jury trial from the ancient Greeks. 
35
 See PETERSON Supra, FN 30.
36
 Id.  The Jews in Moses company numbered in the millions.
37
 Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process:  Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 
2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89 (2001).
Competition forces to pass along the savings obtained from arbitration (reduced costs and reduced 
exposure) to the consumer.  Professor Ware points out that businesses tend to be “profit-maximizing” 
organizations.  Professor Ware points out businesses will usually follow the rate-of-return equalization 
principle.
15
American courts are full of crowded dockets and overworked judges and 
binding arbitration does provide some relief for those conditions.  
There is a steady stream of historical references to the binding 
arbitration process spanning the centuries since Moses lived.38 Romans used 
arbitration in civil matters on a limited basis, and as Rome conquered 
Europe they spread its use throughout Europe before the Middle Ages. 
Moses and the Jewish people became accustomed to the presence of 
arbitrators in their midst. Throughout the Bible various references are made 
to judges who served in Israel.39 Those arbitrators were heroes who led the 
Jewish people during some very rough times of oppression, but all of them 
were also people who served as arbiters of the peoples’ problems.40
References in Islamic literature reveal arbitration was used to settle disputes 
as early as the 7th Century A.D.41
In its purest form, arbitration is simply a form of private judging. 
Jewish rabbinical courts have used the arbitration model for the resolution of 
complaints for hundreds of years.42  Modern Rabbinical courts consist of 
rabbis who are well versed in the Torah (Jewish law).  The Torah arbitration 
38
 Douglas Hurt Yarn, Commercial Arbitration In Olde England, DISPUTE RESOLUTION JOURNAL, 
January 1995
The oldest evidence of arbitration in post-Roman England is the Anglo-Saxon’s arbitration of pending 
judicial cases.  During the middle ages the courts and arbitration were somewhat inseparable.  As a 
result, arbitrations in Olde England had similar characteristics to an adjudication process.
39
 See MASTER BIBLE, Supra, FN 31, The Book of Judges.
40
 Id.
41
 Abualy A. Aziz, Ima’mat in Arabia 600-765 A.D. History of Ismailism website, 2004.
16
process involves rabbis who serve as judges, but who are not employed by a 
public court system.43  During the Middle Ages arbitration was used to 
resolve problems in the guild system.44
Arbitration came to the United States as a result of its use in Europe.  
United States law is based predominantly upon English law. The English 
have used arbitration successfully to resolve disputes for centuries as an 
adjunct process to its judicial system.  In the United States two of the more 
famous individuals who have been involved in the arbitration process are 
George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. Washington himself was an 
arbitrator and used arbitration to resolve land disputes in the state of 
Virginia.45 Lincoln served as a judge and arbitrator in Illinois.46  Lincoln 
developed a reputation as a fair arbiter of disputes and served as a referee in 
horse races and cock fights.47
Arbitration in Europe was a binding semi-judicial process until it was 
changed by the English Common Law.  Under the common law, arbitration 
42
 Rabbinical Counsel of California.  Rabbinical Administrators handle financial arbitration, conversion, 
divorce and miscellaneous matters.
43
 Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judgery, paper prepared for a symposium on 
“The Coming Crisis in Mandatory Arbitration:  New perspectives and possibilities,” DUKE 
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, October 4-5, 2002.  Professor Drahozal discussed the behavioral 
aspects of arbitrators and how bias may affect their decisions making.
44
 Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice:  Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 
CALF. L. REV. 577 (1997)
45
 T.H Matteson, “George Washington, Boy Hero and Arbitrator”, CIRCA 1740, PICTURE HISTORY 
LLC (2003)
46
 Abraham Lincoln Research site, Morton 2004.  Lincoln served briefly as a judge and arbitrator and his 
service as a referee in contests made him famous in Illinois.
47
 Id.
17
was not considered an ironclad, binding process.48  In fact, the common law 
treated arbitration as a revocable principle-agent process up until the time 
the arbitration hearing actually took place.49 Arbitrators were deemed to be 
the agents of the parties, and under common law an agency can be revoked 
at any time.50 The 1845 case of Tobey v. County of Bristol51 is an example of 
how American courts adopted the English common law approach prior to the 
Federal Arbitration Act providing for statutory arbitration.  The English 
courts began to treat contracts for arbitration as non-binding under what 
became known as the revocability doctrine that was set forth in Vynoir’s 
case.52 The essence of the revocability doctrine is that as agents of the parties 
the agency of the arbitrators can be revoked any time prior to the actual 
arbitration hearing.  In the 1918 case of Hedley v. Aetna,53 it was held that 
agreements to oust or defeat the jurisdiction of courts as to the resolution of 
differences between the parties were not allowed.  This is an example of the 
48
 Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942).  Agreements to 
arbitrate had little validity at common law.  Parties were not bound by agreements to arbitrate unless and 
until they actually arbitrated.
49
 Id.
50
 Id.
51
 Tobey v. County of Bristol, Fed. Case. No. 14065, at 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).  This case held that 
when parties agree that arbitration agreements are irrevocable it serves no purpose, because arbitration 
agreements are, by their very nature revocable.  See also Insurance Company v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 
(1874).  A party cannot bind himself in advance by an agreement to arbitrate, but may select the courts or 
arbitration whenever he decides to present the case.
52
 Vynoir’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1609)
53
 Headley v. Aetna, 80 So. 466, 202 Ala. 384 (1918).  Parties are not allowed to enter an agreement to 
arbitrate that will be held to bind the parties to arbitration after a dispute arises.  Such agreements would 
effectively oust or defeat the jurisdiction of courts.
18
so-called judicial hostility that was pervasive in the U.S. Court system until 
the time of the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act.  
In 1925, the United States Congress enacted the United States 
Arbitration Act, and this Act was codified in 1947, as the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA).54  The purpose of the FAA was to eliminate the judicial hostility 
that had existed at common law against arbitration.55 At common law, once 
the parties had arbitrated a case and received an award, one of them had to 
bring suit for the enforcement of the award. Under statutory arbitration, such 
as was envisioned by the FAA, the party would simply file a motion to 
confirm the award.56 If a case was pending at the time, the arbitration award 
would become the final judgment of the court in that case, and a separate 
action to enforce the award would not be required.57 Pragmatically, the 
common-law doctrine of revocability died with the FAA.  With the passage 
54
 9 U.S.C. 1 et. seq.
55
 Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S.1 (1984) 
The owner and franchiser of a chain of convenience stores was sued in a class action that included 
more than 800 of its franchisees.  The California Superior court held that arbitration was appropriate, 
except in the California Franchise Investment Law Claims.  The California Court of Appeals held that all 
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Supremacy Clause and was thus pre-empted.  Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion stated that the limited 
objective of the Federal Arbitration Act was to abrogate the common-law rule against specific 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.  Justice O’Connor’s dissent characterized the Federal Arbitration 
Act as a procedural statute applicable only in federal courts.
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of the FAA the federal courts began to treat arbitration as a contract for 
specific performance rather than as a common-law agency arrangement. 
Under statutory arbitration, an agreement to arbitrate becomes a specific 
performance issue that can be the subject of a motion to compel performance 
of the contract in lieu of litigation.58 The FAA effectively did away with 
common law arbitration and allowed parties to contract for specific 
performance of arbitration, which yielded results that were binding.59
  New York became the first state to pass a statutory arbitration law in 
1920.60 The United States Arbitration Act of 1925 was modeled after the 
New York arbitration statute.61  After much discussion and not a few 
hearings on the effect of a national arbitration statute, the United States 
Arbitration Act was passed as an Article III federal procedural act.62 In 1947, 
the United States Arbitration Act became the FAA in its present form as 
codified in 9 United States Code Section 1 et. seq.  Although the FAA calls 
for the enforcement of binding arbitration agreements, many jurists assumed 
it only applied in federal courts.  State courts were reluctant to follow the 
58
 Id. Section 4
59
 Id. Section 2
60
 JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT PAN, EDWARD F. SHERMAN, ARBITRATION, Foundation 
Press, New York, p. 54, (1996).
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specific performance mandates of the FAA and state laws continued to deny 
specific performance in arbitration cases.63
Believing the FAA to be an Article III procedural act, the federal courts 
did not initially interfere with states that refused specific performance of 
arbitration agreements in their state court cases.  Statutory rights cases in 
federal courts were also considered “off limits” for specific performance of 
arbitration agreements.  Wilco v. Swan64 is an example of the United States 
Supreme Court’s attitude toward the FAA in statutory rights cases prior to 
the high courts more recent policy in favor of binding arbitration.  Federal 
cases prior to Wilco v. Swan demonstrate that although the FAA’s specific 
performance mandates were recognized as substantive federal law, the FAA 
was not enforced against parties seeking to litigate their statutory rights.65
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon66 changed the way the federal 
courts viewed binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements in statutory rights 
claims cases.  Shearson/American Express v. McMahon created a significant 
burden for statutory rights claimants endeavoring to defeat the specific 
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 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).  The court in this case stated that arbitration was desirable, but that 
certain rights under federal statute are not arbitrable.  The court ruled that a judicial forum provided for 
under Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 could not be waived.  The arbitration agreement between a 
securities broker and a customer was held to be invalid.
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 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon 482 U.S. 220 (1987).  The U.S. Supreme Court held the 
plaintiffs in a security case to the burden of demonstrating that “congress intended to make an exception 
to the Arbitration Act for claims arising under RICO and the Securities And Exchange Act.”  Congress 
did not address arbitration in the Securities and Exchange Act and, therefore, the McMahon’s burden was 
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performance requirements of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.  The 
plaintiff seeking to avoid arbitration is required to prove that the U.S. 
Congress intended the statutory right be litigated and excluded from 
arbitration.67  This presents an impossible burden of proof for plaintiffs in 
most cases, because the congressional record on these acts did not contain 
references to litigation rights or arbitration. 
The utilization of binding arbitration in the United States has increased 
at a rapid pace in consumer cases due to the holdings of the United States 
Supreme Court during the past quarter century in cases involving the FAA.68
Despite the federal courts receptiveness to arbitration, the state courts were 
especially slow to enforce specific performance of arbitration against 
consumers due to its procedural nature and the remaining hostility toward 
arbitration in the judicial system.69
The FAA was supported by the business sector from the initial drafting 
stage to the passage of the Act in 1925, and business lawyers lobbied hard 
for the act’s passage.70  There was and is a reason for the business 
communities’ historical support of binding consumer arbitration over 
67
 Id.
68
 Id.
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 R. Pepper Crutcher, Jr., Overcoming Mississippi Common Law Hostility to Arbitration, THE 
FEDERALIST SOCIETY, 2003.
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litigation.71 Businesses have used the FAA to reduce litigation expenses, 
eliminate runaway verdicts and predict outcomes.72 Businesses have a long 
history with the arbitration process, but consumers have little, if any, 
experience with binding arbitration.73   If knowledge is power, the business 
community has achieved a higher degree of power than the average 
consumer with this process.
HISTORY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE:
Specific performance is an equitable remedy.74  Although courts of 
equity and courts of law are no longer separate courts in most states, in early 
English law these courts were very distinct.75  Courts of law provided the 
remedy of damages, while courts of chancery dealt with equity matters.76
The presiding official in a law court was a judge, a lawyer turned jurist who 
had earned a reputation as a good legal mind.77  The presiding official in a 
71
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 Hossam M. Fohmy, Arbitration:  Wiping Out Consumer Rights?  64 TEX. B.J. 917 (2001)
The definition of “fair and just resolution” may be different for consumers and businesses.  The 
business interests use arbitration to reduce legal costs and protect themselves from high jury verdicts.  
Fairness in securing the agreement to arbitrate (Hill v. Gateway) and fairness in the implementation of 
the agreement (Green Tree Financial v. Randolph) don’t seem to be a part of the “fair and just” concept.  
The Gateway case required consumers to use the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration 
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court of chancery was called a chancellor.78  The background of the early 
chancellors was that of a cleric or an accomplished politician who was 
appointed by the King or Queen of England.79  Chancellors were often 
members of the clergy who had the political savory necessary to gain 
appointment as a chancellor.  Parties to a civil action were not sent to a 
chancery court unless the potential damages in their legal case were 
inadequate.80  A contracts case would not be referred to a chancery court to 
obtain an equitable remedy such as specific performance unless the legal 
remedy for breach was totally inappropriate.81
Jury trials were not permitted in chancery courts, because the chancellor 
decided the case using equitable principles.82  The King of England set up 
the chancery courts to operate under a different set of rules from those 
utilized in law courts.83  The guiding principle of chancery courts of equity 
was to produce decisions based on fairness rather than on the technicalities 
of the law.84  Chancery courts differed from law courts in that they could 
order a party to do something (specific performance) or refrain from doing 
78
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something (injunction).85  Over the centuries the chancery court became 
corrupt, costly and slow.86  In England, the court of Chancery was abolished 
by the Judicature Act of 1873, and the chancery court became a division of 
the High Court of Justice.87
Most of the chancery or equity courts have also disappeared in the 
United States.  Some states like Delaware and Tennessee still have chancery 
courts, but the vast majority of states grant equity powers to their superior or 
circuit courts, thereby allowing these courts to sit as both a court of equity 
and a court of law.88  When deciding equity matters, these courts are 
required to use the same Maxims of equity utilized by the chancery courts.89
These merged courts allow for a more efficient system of implementing 
justice, because one court can award damages and/or specific performance.90
The courts of equity in existence in most states in modern times are the 
bankruptcy courts.91  The original chancery courts of equity operated under 
the jurisdiction and authority of the English monarch to order specific acts.92
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The power of the monarch was replaced by the state constitutions and 
statutes in the United States, which govern court jurisdiction.93
Chancery courts would not grant specific performance each time a 
contract was breached.94  In order to obtain specific performance, an 
aggrieved party had to demonstrate a unique set of circumstances from 
which the chancellor could determine that legal damages would not be 
suitable.95  Chancery courts also used certain Maxims such as laches, 
estoppel and the clean hands doctrine (he who seeks equity, must do equity) 
to screen the cases to be heard.96  If the aggrieved party had violated one of 
these Maxims no relief was available in the chancery courts.97  The chancery 
courts also examined any underlying contract to determine if the terms of the 
contract were unenforceable or unconscionable.98  In modern times, a party 
seeking specific performance is not required to meet these heavy burdens of 
proof that were necessary to get a case heard in the chancery courts.
In American courts the specific enforcement of contracts is also 
governed by the principles of the UCC, especially Article 2, which governs 
sales contracts.99  UCC 2-716 provides that specific performance may be 
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available when the goods are unique.100  UCC 2-302 permits courts to 
declare a contract unfair and decline to enforce it.101  Arbitration agreements 
are usually constructed in such a way that any legal remedy would be 
inadequate for their breach, and the only remedy that makes sense is specific 
performance.
“The maxim, ‘he who seeks equity must do equity’ presupposes that 
equitable, as distinguished from legal, rights have arisen from the subject-
matter in favor of each of the parties; and it requires that such rights shall not 
be enforced in favor of one who affirmatively seeks their enforcement 
except upon condition that he consents to accord to the other party the same 
correlative equitable rights.”102  “Legal rights are as safe in chancery as they 
are in a court of law, and however strong an appeal may be to the conscience 
of a chancellor for equitable relief, he is powerless to grant if the one from 
whom it must come will be deprived of a legal right.”103  These quotes are 
from cases decided in the first half of the twentieth century, and they purport 
to require anyone seeking specific performance to grant to their opposing 
party the same equitable rights they seek and not violate the other party’s 
legal rights.  As will be shown in this article’s review of more modern cases, 
100
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these equitable maxims have all but disappeared from consideration in ruling 
upon the validity of arbitration contracts.
Specific performance allows a court of equity to compel a party to 
perform under a contract.104  Courts of equity have discretion over whether 
to order performance and may refuse to do so if the terms of the contract are 
unfair, the consideration inadequate, if the enforcement of the contract will 
cause unreasonable hardship or loss or if the contract was secured by 
misrepresentation.105  Prior to the modern era of FAA enforcement of 
arbitration agreements through specific performance, it was generally
understood that courts would not compel specific performance of arbitration 
agreements lest they oust their own jurisdiction in such matters.106  At 
common law arbitration agreements could not be specifically enforced.107
Through the years following the passage of the FAA, the aversion to order 
specific enforcement of arbitration contracts disappeared, along with most of 
specific performance’s equity hurdles.  
THE EVOLUTION OF ARBITRATION CASE LAW:
One of the most cited cases regarding the federal policy favoring 
arbitration is Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction 
104WALTER JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS THIRD EDITION, Baker, Voorh’s and Co., Inc. 
(1968) Vd. 11 Sect.     1418.
105
 John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts Matthew Berder & Company, 2001 P. 261
106
 Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Insurance Company, 398 P2d 873, 876 (1965)
107
 Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 130 (1924)
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Company.108  The Moses H. Cone case involved a North Carolina Hospital 
and an Alabama Contractor. Justice Brennen in Moses H. Cone opined, 
“there is a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” and his words from 
that decision have appeared in a significant number of cases sustaining the 
current liberal federal policy toward arbitration.  Those words have been 
used to by-pass consideration of equity principles in the legal analysis of 
arbitration clauses by federal courts.
The liberal federal policy soon found its way from federal courts into 
state court cases and pre-empted contrary state law.  Southland v. Keating,109
a California case, held that a California statute which invalidated specific 
performance under certain arbitration agreements deemed covered by the 
FAA violated the Supremacy Clause and the California statute was thus pre-
empted by the FAA.  This was one of the first cases to disavow the state law 
claims argument that claims arising in state court involving state laws are 
not subject to the FAA’s federal preemption.  The state law claims argument 
108
 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Company, 460 U.S. 1 (1983)
The hospital, a North Carolina corporation, and the contractor, an Alabama Corporation entered into 
a contract for construction of additions at the hospital.  The contract contained a binding arbitration 
clause.  According to Justice Brenen, who wrote the opinion in this case, there is a liberal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements under the FAA.  The opinion stated the FAA created a body of federal substantive 
law of arbitrability.  “Questions of arbitrability are to be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal 
policy favoring arbitration.
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 Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).  A California investment law which invalidated arbitration     
agreements in investment cases was found to contradict the Federal Arbitration Act and was held to 
violate the Supremacy Clause.  Southland was the first in a line of cases that moved the federal policy in 
favor of arbitration into the state court system.  Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Southland reiterated the 
view that the FAA was only applicable in Federal courts.
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was that the FAA is a federal procedural act under Article III and should 
only cover federal claims in federal court. The majority in Southland held 
that Congress intended for the Commerce Clause to be read broadly and, 
therefore, the FAA presumptively applies in all state and federal courts to all
arbitration agreements.110  However, Justice O’Connor’s dissent in 
Southland stated significant reasons to keep the traditional view of the 
FAA’s application limited to federal courts as an Article III procedural act, 
and not as a substantive law statute.111  Justice O’Connor pointed out the 
FAA’s legislative history was unambiguous, and that from the outset 
Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute only applicable in federal 
courts.
A few years later, the United States Supreme Court held in Volt 
Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior 
University112 that California law could prescribe procedures for the 
110
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Volt was a contractor that agreed to install electrical conduit on the Stanford campus in a contract 
containing a choice of law provision designating California law under which the contract would be 
enforced.  Following a dispute over payment for additional work, Stanford sued Volt in a California 
Court.  Volt moved to send the case to arbitration, but the court refused under a California statute which 
provides arbitration must be stayed until related litigation is resolved.  The California Court of Appeal 
affirmed and the California Supreme Court refused to hear the case on discretionary review.  The U.S. 
Supreme court affirmed the trial court and held that the FAA will not automatically preempt state law if 
the parties have contracted for state law to govern the arbitration between them.  Opponents of binding 
arbitration thought initially that this case represented a change in direction for the high court, but 
subsequent cases demonstrated this case dealt with a very specific law and was not a movement to allow 
states to pen their own brand of arbitration.
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arbitration process that were different from those described in the Federal 
Arbitration Act as long as the contract between the parties had agreed 
California law would be used to govern the arbitration agreement.  The state 
law the of California was named by the parties as the governing law of 
contract in the Volt case.  Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Volt stated 
that the FAA was designed to overcome the judicial hostility toward 
arbitration, but it was not designed to make every case arbitrable every 
time.113 The FAA was designed to put arbitration clauses on the same 
footing as other contracts.114 Volt was temporarily viewed as a softening of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s substantive law stance on the applicability of the 
FAA, but a New York case and an Alabama case soon proved that the U.S. 
Supreme Court was not backing down from its substantive law policy 
regarding the FAA’s specific performance mandates regarding pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements.
In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinions in Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton115 and Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson.116 These 
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115Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995).  Justice Steven’s majority opinion in this 
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two cases affirmed the court’s pre-Volt stance of pre-empting any state law 
in conflict with the FAA’s specific performance mandates on grounds that 
the FAA is the substantive law of the land applicable in all courts.117  In 
Mastrobuono the court held that a New York statute which disallowed 
punitive damages in arbitration, could not be used to disallow punitive 
damages awarded by arbitrators.118 The Supreme Court held that the parties’ 
contract contained no reference to punitive damages being excluded and, 
therefore, punitive damages were permissible.119 Although the contract 
stated it would be governed by the laws of the state of New York, which 
disallows punitive damages, the contract also designated the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) arbitration rules as the process 
rules for the arbitration. The NASD rules allowed arbitrators to return 
punitive damages and other relief, and the Supreme Court interpreted the 
NASD rules permitted punitive damages under the FAA.120 Mastroubouno 
implied that a party could get the same relief in arbitration as in court, which 
may have been the underlying message the Supreme Court was endeavoring 
to send about arbitration’s separate, but allegedly equal forum status.
117
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Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson involved an Alabama homeowner 
who purchased a house with an existing termite guarantee plan.121  A termite 
infestation caused damage to the house and following failed attempts to 
correct the damage, the homeowner sued Terminex. The termite plan was 
not a contract between the homeowner and Terminex, but had been 
transferred as a part of the closing documents when the homeowner 
purchased the house from the prior owner.122 The Supreme Court of 
Alabama refused to order specific performance of an arbitration provision in 
the termite plan based upon Alabama’s anti-predispute arbitration statute 
which declared pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate unenforceable.123
The U.S. Supreme Court in Terminex held that the Alabama statute 
prohibiting specific performance of pre-dispute arbitration agreements was 
unconstitutional if the contract containing the arbitration clause led to a 
transaction involving interstate commerce.124 The shipment of pest control 
chemicals from outside the state of Alabama into Alabama to treat the house 
was deemed sufficient to bring the contract under the Commerce Clause and 
thus subject it to the Supremacy Clause. The Alabama statute conflicted with 
the FAA mandates for specific performance of an arbitration agreement, and 
121
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it was pre-empted by the FAA under the Supremacy Clause.125 Although the 
pre-dispute arbitration clause in the termite plan was unenforceable under 
Alabama law, specific performance of the arbitration agreement was 
enforced rigorously under the FAA.126  Alabama law was the law of the 
contract, but Alabama law was not allowed to govern the contract’s 
arbitration clause.  The Terminex decision and the Mastroburono decision 
created a judicial oddity.  The arbitration clauses were enforceable under 
federal law, while the remainder of the contracts were subject to state law.
There was much confusion in Alabama’s legal community, over the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Terminex.  The Alabama Supreme Court’s 
Terminex opinion after the remand expressed some of that confusion.127 The 
Alabama Supreme Court ruling on remand of the Terminex decision 
contained a concurring opinion that could best be described as an indication 
of one justice’s frustration with the views of his fellow justices.128
Alabama’s code law on arbitration was effective before the FAA became 
effective federal policy.129  Some in Alabama’s legal community felt 
Terminex was an intrusion into Alabama’s right to establish its own contract 
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law pertaining to arbitration.  As will be shown later in this note, Alabama’s 
Supreme Court did not accept the U.S. Supreme Courts’ broad reading of the 
commerce power of Congress and took the initiative to preserve Alabama’s 
public policy.130
It is easy to understand why state courts felt they had a “green light” 
from the United States Supreme Court to apply state contract law to 
arbitration clauses contained in a contract governed by a named state law.  
The Volt case created that presumption.  Apparently, the United States 
Supreme Court in the Volt opinion was not stating that any state law could 
be applied to arbitration agreements contained in a contract governed by 
state law, but only state law that allowed arbitration clauses to operate on the 
same footing as other contracts.131  The Volt case also led to the assumption 
that states could limit the enforcement of arbitration clauses, as long as the 
clauses were not struck down in their entirety.  This soon proved to be an 
erroneous assumption.
In Doctor’s Associates v. Casorotto132 the U.S. Supreme Court 
effectively removed state law policies regarding specific performance 
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A Montana opinion styled Cassarotto v. Lombardi 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995) held that a notice 
requirement regarding contract arbitration did not conflict with the FAA.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed by holding the additional notice requirement violated the FAA’s requirement that arbitration 
clauses be given the same treatment as any other contract-the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Capital 
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restrictions in arbitration cases.  The Cassaroto case involved a Montana 
statute that required any contract subject to arbitration to contain a capital 
letter notification regarding the arbitration clause on the first page of the 
contract.133 The U.S. Supreme court pre-empted Montana’s notice statute 
upon the grounds that it violated the “same footing as other contracts” 
language of the FAA.134  The Cassorotto opinion served notice on the states 
that they were not free to place their own restrictions on the specific 
performance mandates of the FAA.
The above referenced U.S. Supreme Court decisions put to rest the state 
law claims arguments against specific performance in binding consumer 
arbitration and to some extent encouraged federal courts to engage in 
judicial activism in favor of binding arbitration.  In addition to pre-empting 
any contrary state law prohibiting specific performance in arbitration 
contracts, the United States Supreme Court also rendered decisions which 
removed long-standing traditional doctrines such as the intertwining claims 
doctrine.  The intertwining doctrine as stated in DeLanire v. Birr, Wilson 
and Co.135 is that arbitration should be denied where common law claims are 
intertwined with rights based claims such as statutory violations of security 
letter notice requirement went beyond the requirement of the FAA and was thus pre-empted under the 
Supremacy Clause.  This opinion made it clear that states do not have the right to pass laws that restrict 
the effectiveness of the FAA.
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laws.  The United States Supreme Court rejected the intertwining doctrine in 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd136 and held that the FAA requires federal 
courts to compel arbitration in cases where the grounds of the various claims 
are mixed.  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Byrd stated that the strong 
federal policy in favor of arbitration was not an admonition to use alternative 
dispute resolution methods to settle cases, but a mandate for specific 
enforcement of arbitration contracts.137
The United States Supreme Court has made the weight of the mandate 
for specific performance in arbitration cases vividly clear.  Longstanding 
traditions notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has established a bright line 
test for the applicability of specific performance to arbitration clauses in the 
courts of this land.138  Federal law now favors specific performance of 
arbitration clauses, and any order denying specific performance of a valid 
arbitration clause must contain adequate and articulated reasons for the 
denial of specific performance.139  Thus, case law has evolved from treating 
arbitration agreements as totally unenforceable in the cases decided prior to 
the FAA, to completely enforceable in most cases decided since the mid-
1980s’.
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WHY IS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND BINDING ARBITRATION A 
MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE?
The United States Supreme Court and the sundry federal courts can 
issue all the legal decisions they desire regarding binding arbitration, but 
absent the power of enforcement through the equitable remedy of specific 
enforcement these decisions would be of little effect.  The only remedy a 
court of law can award is damages or dismissal, but a court with equity 
powers can order the parties to take a course of action.140  Therefore, to 
avoid court orders enforceable only by a grant of compensatory damages, 
the courts had to marry the equity enforcement powers of specific 
performance to contract law governing arbitration agreements to achieve the 
goal of forcing parties to take a course of action.  Some members of the bar 
have become very troubled that existing contract law defenses and other 
legal defenses related to their clients legal rights have been unsuccessful in 
overcoming specific performance orders.  However, one only has to look at 
the nature of these defenses to understand why they fail against specific 
performance.  Asserting a legal defense to an equitable remedy will not work 
because law is subservient to equity.  Using the federal law versus state law 
140 Wikipedia article on “Equity,” Wikipedia. Org (2004)
38
analogy, equity preempts law.  A legal right may not be exercised against an 
equity order.141 Although courts of equity and courts of law are generally 
merged, equity Maxims are still independently viable.142  Equity has clear 
supremacy over law.143  The attorneys representing clients who wish to set 
aside pre-dispute arbitration agreements face a significant hurdle.  Legal 
defenses are unavailable to challenge an equitable remedy, but the courts 
have severely curtailed, and to some extent eliminated, the equitable 
defenses to specific performance.  Thus, the marriage of law to equity in 
arbitration is not only marriage of convenience, it is a marriage of power.
EQUITY MAXIMS:
The enforcement of arbitration clauses through the equitable remedy of 
specific performance is not a problem free environment.  If a party seeks an 
equitable remedy, that party allegedly subjects himself or herself to the 
Maxims of Equity.144  The Maxims, or fundamental principles of equity are 
as follows:
1. Equity will not allow a Right to be without a Remedy.
2. Equity follows the Law.
3. He who seeks Equity must do Equity.
141
 Proivneias O’Cillin, “History of Law in Ireland” law course, cs. Ted. Ie (2004).
142
 American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys Co., 293 F. 633, 637 1923).
143
 See PROIVNEIAS O’CILLIN, Supra, FN 141.
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4. He who comes into Equity must come with Clean Hands.
5. Delay defeats Equity.
6. Equality is Equity.
7. Equity views the Intent rather than the Form.
8. Equity regards as Done what ought to be Done.
9. Equity imputes an Intention to fulfill an Obligation.
10. Equity acts in Personam.
11. If the equities are equal, the first in time Prevails.
12. If the equities are equal, the Law prevails.145
Clearly, the supporters of binding arbitration love specific performance, 
but from time to time seem to have difficulty with some of the Maxims of 
Equity.  These Maxims should theoretically be accepted to gain enforcement 
of arbitration agreements through specific performance.  Maxim one provide 
that a party’s statutory rights must be preserved.  Drafting techniques are 
used to limit this Maxim’s equity defense by requiring parties to waive their 
rights prior to any actual controversy.  Most federal arbitration decisions 
have held the aggrieved party’s rights were waived by contract when the 
arbitration agreement was signed.  Constitutional law cases regarding waiver 
usually mention the words “freely”, “voluntarily” and “knowingly” 
145
 Id.
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somewhere in the decision.  Perhaps more time should be devoted to a 
discussion of whether legal and equitable rights can be freely, voluntarily 
and knowingly waived if the party who waives them is unaware of their 
existence or the effect of the waiver.
Maxim two is generally followed, except in the special rules applicable 
to arbitration agreements.  The so-called separability doctrine is one of these 
special rules.  Although arbitration clauses may be examined under the 
general principles of contract law, the enforceability of the arbitration clause 
itself must be examined separately from the underlying contract.146  If the 
container contract is void, the arbitration clause may still be valid if a 
separate analysis of the clause reveals it is enforceable.147
Due to case law in arbitration, the courts have carved out an exception 
for arbitration clauses, which state that the arbitration clause must be 
examined on a stand alone basis for its own validity.148 Therefore, it is 
possible that the container contract will be void ab initio, while the 
arbitration clause will be held valid, because the parties seeking to set it 
aside cannot prove that the agreement to arbitrate was procured on the same 
146
 Stevens/Lein Weber/ Sullivan’s, Inc. v. Holm Development and Management, Inc., 795 P.2d 1308 
(1990)
147
 Id at 1311.
148
 David S. Schwarty, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:  Employee and Consumer Rights in 
an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33-36, 60-98, 111-126 (1997)
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basis as the container contract.149  In other words, to successfully attack an
arbitration agreement which is part of a voided container contract, the 
complaining party must prove that the arbitration agreement itself was 
procured by fraud or some other valid contract defense. This is an 
exceedingly difficult burden for a complainant to carry, and it has resulted in 
arbitration agreements being held valid which might have otherwise been 
rejected as a part of the container contract.  Although the Doctrine of 
Severability of individual contract parts is not new to the area of contract 
law, the Separability Doctrine is a new concept created to sustain what 
would normally be unsustainable pre-dispute arbitration clauses in 
agreements.  
The doctrine of severablility, upon which the separability doctrine is 
based, held that if a container contract was void because of a defense leading 
to its recession, then the arbitration clause may survive.150  However, under 
the severability doctrine, if the contract was void ab initio then even the 
arbitration clause would be invalid and unenforceable.151  Under the 
separability doctrine the courts treat the arbitration clause as a separate 
149
 RAASCH v. NCR Corp. 254 F. Supp. 2d 847 (2003)
150
 Tanya J. Monestier, “Nothing comes of nothing-or does it???  A critical re-examination of the doctrine 
of separability in American Arbitration”,  12 AM. REV. INT’L AVG. 223 (2001)
151
 Id. at 227.
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agreement which may be enforced independently of the underlying contract, 
and may be held valid even if the contract as a whole was void ab initio.152
Equity Maxims four and five were problematic for arbitration’s 
supporters until the “shrink wrap” cases.  “Shrink wrap” cases are those 
opinions which have held that arbitration agreements are valid that were 
included in a package of documents delivered with a product.153  The 
consumer purchaser neither read nor signed the agreements prior to the 
delivery of the product.  Although these “agreements” have the appearance 
of an ambush, they have generally been held to be valid.  This article will 
discuss the “shrink wrap” cases in a discussion of Hill v. Gateway.154
Maxim seven requires the court to look at intent rather than form in 
making a decision regarding whether to order the parties to specifically 
perform.  This Maxim provides a nice bridge between the first six Maxims 
which appear to favor the consumer, and the last five Maxims which appear 
to favor the business community.  The intent of the consumer may have been 
to preserve the right to a jury trial, whereas the intent of the business may 
have been to avoid a jury trial at all cost.  Therefore, Maxim seven seems to 
“cut” from both sides of the proverbial “card deck”, and it stacks an equal 
number of “cards” on each side.  If there was no clear intent by the 
152
 Id. at 228.
153
 Hill v. Gateway, 105 F. 3d 1147 (1997)
154
 Id.
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consumer to accept the arbitration agreement, perhaps mutuality is lacking.  
On the other hand, if a consumer accepted the term proposed by the 
business, then the consumer should be held to the contractual terms.  
Unfortunately, the federal courts are not so well versed on Maxim seven, 
and have held that arbitration agreements are not invalid due to lack of 
mutuality.155
The Equity Maxims eight through twelve are an integral part of many 
arbitration decisions in favor of specific performance.  These decisions 
require contract enforcement by the persons involved based upon the law 
(FAA) and with a view toward fulfillment of the parties obligations to each 
other under the contract.     
LESSONS LEARNED FROM GILMER v. INTERSTATE/JOHNSON 
LANE CORP.
Although statutory claims could presumably be ordered to arbitration 
after Shearson in 1987, it was generally assumed civil rights claims could 
not be arbitrated.  The 1991 case of Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane 
Corp.,156 held that civil rights claims can be ordered to arbitration. The trial 
155
 RAASCH Supra, FN 149.
156
 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  Plaintiff contended his ADEA claim was 
not subject to arbitration.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the securities agreement signed by 
plaintiff could subject plaintiff to compulsory arbitration.  The Supreme Court held that age
discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to arbitration agreement in securities 
registration application.
44
court in Gilmer denied arbitration based upon the Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver157 case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court some seventeen years 
earlier.  The area of civil rights was thought to be different from other 
statutory claims prior to Gilmer.  The Gilmer case eliminated some of the 
last bastions of resistance to arbitration in two areas:  Civil rights and 
employment claims.  Prior to Gilmer most courts treated employment claims 
as non-arbitrable due to the language of the Federal Arbitration Act.  
Following Gilmer a rise occurred in the number of arbitration clauses 
inserted in employment contracts.  Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 
105 (2001), held employment contracts to be subject to the FAA.  
In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a general arbitration clause 
in a collective bargaining agreement did not require a union member to 
Arbitration of registered securities representative’s age discrimination claim was not inadequate, 
despite representative’s contention that arbitration procedures did not provide for broad equitable relief 
and class actions, inasmuch as arbitrators had power to fashion equitable relief.
Gilmer is bound by his agreement to arbitrate unless he can show an inherent conflict between 
arbitration and the ADEA’s underlying purposes.
The unequal bargaining power between employers and employees is not a sufficient reason to hold 
that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.
“[B] y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded 
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”
The burden is on Gilmer to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for 
ADEA claims.
157
 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).  Prior to Gilmer, this case was interpreted as 
prohibiting compulsory arbitration of civil rights claims.
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arbitrate a disability claim.158 The high court refused to compel an employee 
to forego litigation of an American with Disabilities Act claim as a result of 
being a union member.159 EEOC v. Waffle House160 allowed the EEOC to 
proceed outside arbitration, even though the employee of Waffle House was 
bound by the arbitration agreement.  Gilmer served notice that there are no 
“sacred cows” in enforcement of arbitration agreements.  Arbitration can be 
enforced under the FAA without contravening federal civil rights anti-
discrimination policies or violating employees rights.161
HILL v. GATEWAY:
While attorneys and judges were still pondering the long reaching 
effects of Gilmer, a new case came along that opened a Pandora’s Box in 
this area of law.  Federal courts ruled that parties may be held to binding 
arbitration agreements they have signed (Southland v. Keating) and 
158
 Wright v. Universal Marine Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) Wright was a longshoreman and was a 
member of a union.  Wright filed an action against Universal Marine when it refused to employ him after 
he settled a disability claim.  The district court dismissed the case with prejudice because Wright failed to 
pursue arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement.  The U.S. Supreme held that the collective 
bargaining agreement did not force Wright to arbitrate his ADA claim.  The court held that “in order for 
a union to waive employee’s rights to a judicial forum for statutory claims, the agreement to arbitrate 
must clear and unmistakable.”
159
 Id.
160
 EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2000) Employment agreement selecting arbitration as forum for 
resolution of disputes does not bar EEOC from pursuing victim – specific judicial relief based upon 
allegations of a violation of Americans with Disabilities Act.  Binding arbitration agreement between 
employee and employer does not bind EEOC.
161
 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) Arbitration agreements can be enforced under 
the FAA without contravening federal anti-discrimination policies.  The 9th Circuit had held that all 
employment contracts are beyond the reach of the FAA.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that only 
transportation workers are exempt from the FAA.  There fore, employment agreements are subject to the 
FAA.  Reversed and remanded with directions to compel arbitration.
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arbitration agreements contained in contracts under which they sought relief 
(Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson), however, following Hill v. Gateway162
held that parties may also be ordered to specifically perform on arbitration 
agreements contained in shipping documents they have not signed.163 In the 
Hill v. Gateway case, parties were held to have waived their right to litigate 
a warranty claim by presumed assent to an arbitration agreement contained 
in shrink wrap inside a shipping container.164
Gateway did not receive acceptance in all federal courts.  A Kansas 
federal court held that Gateway’s shrink-wrap “documents in the box 
approach” was not part of the original agreement, but rather constituted 
additional terms to which the customer as a consumer had not consented.165
Legal scholars have criticized the holding in Hill v. Gateway because it 
appears to allow businesses to hide arbitration agreements in a group of 
shrink wrap documents and force customers to search for the pre-dispute 
162
 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Circ. 1997).
Circuit Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in this case seemed to cross a mythical line for some consumer 
advocates.  An arbitration agreement was sent in a set of packing documents inside a computer box, and 
was held to be binding upon the consumers who accepted the box and the documents and elected not to 
return the computer.  According to the Gateway opinion, the failure to return the computer resulted in an 
acceptance of the terms contained in the box, including the arbitration agreement.
163
 Id.
164
 Id.
165
 Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.Supp. 2d 1332 (2000).
Klocek, a Missouri resident, purchased a Gateway computer.  Inside the Gateway computer box was 
a copy of Gateway’s “Standard Terms and Conditions Agreement.”  Although there was some 
disagreement between Gateway and Klocek over how he obtained the computer, when a dispute arose 
between Gateway and Klocek, Gateway endeavored to enforce the arbitration agreement.  When Klocek 
filed suit against Gateway, Gateway moved the court to compel arbitration.  The court found that 
Gateway’s Standard Terms and Condition’s Agreement were not part of the original transaction between 
Gateway and Klocek, but were additional terms as contemplated by the UCC.  The Klocek court rejected 
the Hill v. Gateway shrink-wrap case logic and refused to dismiss the Klocek case.
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waiver or suffer the consequences.166  According to one scholar quoted in a 
newspaper article the Supreme Court rewrote the FAA “as a service to 
corporations that don’t like jury trials.”167
Some plaintiff attorneys complain vigorously that the cost of arbitration 
is prohibitive for enforcement of rights, but this argument has not been 
sustained in any case, including Hill v. Gateway, where it was shown that 
the consumer would have to pay almost triple the amount of the product 
purchased in order to arbitrate a warranty claim.168   However, the Klocek 
case examined the financial status of the consumer as opposed to the 
financial status of a business entity when dealing with arbitration 
agreements.  Klocek v. Gateway,169 held that a consumer could not be held 
subject to the same standards as a business.
In many regrets, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Hill v. Gateway is 
difficult to understand.  Judge Easterbrook cited insurance and other 
businesses that operate on the buy now, terms later plan, but he failed to 
explain Gateway’s limited return policy.170  The Seventh Circuit assumed 
166
 Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers, 
FLA. BAR JOURNAL, November 1997.
167
 Reynolds Holding, Private Justice:  Millions are losing their Legal Rights, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, October 7, 2001.  The author quoted Professor Paul Harrington’s comment about the 
Supreme Court and the FAA.
168
 Green Tree Financial v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).  The cost argument was made but the Supreme 
Court declined to respond to it because no proof of cost was contained in the record.
169
 Klocek.  Supra, FN 165.
170
 Id. The court ruled that the Hills had thirty days from receipt of the computer to return the computer, but 
this ruling seems to be difficult to understand in light of Gateway’s return policy of thirty days from date 
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the Gateway return policy was valid for thirty days from the Hill’s receipt of 
the computer, but Gateway’s actual language limited the return period to 
thirty days from date of shipment.  The “acceptance” period could vary from 
as much as three weeks under average shipping conditions, to an expired 
return policy upon arrival if a substantial delay occurred during shipping.  
The Hills could have been placed in the unique situation of returning a 
product under the return policy upon receipt, even though the return period 
on that product had expired before they gained possession of the computer 
or the arbitration agreement.  How could a customer demand specific 
performance in arbitration under terms that had expired before the customer 
received the product?  
Many of the criticisms of Hill v. Gateway focus on the Seventh 
Circuit’s alleged accommodating attitude toward businesses at the expense 
of consumers.171  However, if the Gateway return policy on the computer 
had already expired when the Hills brought their claims in federal court, why 
would the result be unfair to Gateway or to the Hills?172  The court would 
simply be enforcing the terms of Gateway’s return policy.  A computer 
of shipment.  Under Judge Easterbrook’s reasoning the Hills would have enjoyed thirty days in which to 
return the computer, but they may have received a computer that was out of warranty when it arrived.
171
 Richard G. Kunkel, Recent Developments in Shrink Wrap, Clickwrap and Browsewrap Licenses in The 
United States, 9 MURDOCK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LAW 3, 19 (2002).
172
 See Gateway Service Plan, Supra FN 167.  Reynolds Holding, Private Justice:  Millions are losing their 
Legal Rights, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, October 7, 2001.  The author quoted Professor Paul 
Harrington’s comment about the Supreme Court and the FAA.
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manufacturer, and likely other businesses as well, do not exist to 
accommodate customers at every turn to the detriment of their stockholders.  
Customers are free to “vote” for or against products with their ability to 
purchase from competitors that utilize less restrictive terms.  The Hill v. 
Gateway case is but one case in a line of cases often cited by pro-consumer 
groups as indicative of the trampling of consumer rights by a judicial 
system, which favors business.173  However, it is probably the best, or 
perhaps worst, example of a federal court enforcing an agreement for 
specific performance to arbitrate through presumptive assent and laches,
while ignoring the equity Maxims of fairness that accompany specific 
performance.  
DEFENSES TO BINDING PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS:
There are two categories of defenses to arbitration: Pre-arbitration 
hearing defenses and post-arbitration hearing defenses.  There are a number 
of defenses that have been successful in either stopping the arbitration 
process before it starts or setting aside the results. There have also been a 
173
 Reynolds Holding, Private Justice:  Millions are Losing Their Legal Rights, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, October 7, 2001.  Quoting Montana Supreme Court Justice Terry Trieweiler, the article 
states “Mandatory arbitration allows corporations to undermine the whole system by which we hold them 
accountable.  Every day it becomes more pervasive and more oppressive.”  The author adds “A private 
brand of civil justice, one without laws or juries or constitutional rights, has swept quietly across the 
nation’s commercial landscapes, shielding corporations from costly verdicts, compromising judges and 
stripping the public of its right to a day in court.
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number of defenses in both categories that have failed to either stop the 
process or overturn the arbitrator’s award. In general, there are very few 
effective defenses to specific performance in arbitration that work 
consistently, either before or after the hearing.
Pre-hearing defenses that have worked successfully in some cases 
include the entire contract, including the arbitration clause was void ab 
initio.174 The theory is that if there is no contract for arbitration from the 
outset, there can be no agreement to arbitrate.  However, because courts now 
view the arbitration agreement as a separate contract under the separability 
doctrine, the effectiveness of this argument is limited to situations where 
both the container contract and the arbitration agreement were void from the 
outset.  A closely related defense to “no contract” is “no arbitration clause” 
applicable to the party seeking to avoid the arbitration.175 This defense has 
been used successfully when some of the parties agreed to arbitrate, while 
others did not agree to waive their litigation rights.  
174
 National Auction Group, Inc. v. Hammett, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1012145, January 31, 
2003. 
 Homeowner purchased condominium at an auction.  The homeowner’s problems with the Auction 
Group could not be resolved, and the homeowner sued the Auction Group for fraud and negligence in the 
sale of the condominium.  The Auction Group moved to compel arbitration via an arbitration agreement 
signed by condominium owner’s association.  The homeowner was not a signatory to that agreement and 
the court held the homeowner could not be bound by it.
175
 Johnson Mobile Homes v. Hathcock, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1992310, February 21, 2003.
This mobile home fraud, negligence and bad faith case was filed in a circuit court, which denied the 
seller’s motion to compel arbitration.  The Supreme Court of Alabama found no allegation of fraud 
against the arbitration clause, but an allegation of fraud in the procurement of the container contract.  The 
seller was within its rights to compel arbitration against the buyer who signed the arbitration agreement.  
The co-purchaser who did not sign the arbitration agreement was not compelled to arbitrate.  Fraud in the 
inducement of the container contract is arbitrable.
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Arbitration agreements have also been set aside when they were 
unilaterally given by one party and there is no evidence the other party 
assented to arbitrate.176 Fraud in the procurement of the contract as a whole 
will not render the contract non-arbitrable, but allegations of fraud in the 
procurement of the arbitration agreement must be litigated.177 If the terms of 
the contract are unconscionable, the courts may deny a motion to compel 
specific performance of the arbitration agreement.178  If the contract and 
arbitration rules in the arbitration clause result in a rigged process, the court 
may refuse to compel arbitration.179
One of the oldest contract principles is a meeting of the minds.  Mutual 
assent to terms is generally required to form a valid contract. This has been a 
well-understood principle of contract law for centuries. For a contract to be 
valid and enforceable there must be assent in writing, if significant amounts 
of money or property are involved.  However, in recent arbitration cases 
176
 Bodie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cali. App. 1998) Credit card customers held not to 
consent to envelope stuffers containing arbitration agreement.
177
 Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.,  938 P.2d 903 (1997).  Court ruled that HMO patient 
detrimentally relied on HMO’s arbitration agreement after HMO made misrepresentations about its 
arbitration process.
178
 Sears Termite & Pest Control v. Robinson, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 102034, May 23, 2003.
The trial court denied Sears motion to compel arbitration because the Sears contract limited the 
homeowner’s damages in arbitration and was, therefore, unconscionable.  The Alabama Supreme court 
held that limitation of damages language does not render an arbitration clause unenforceable.  Although 
the homeowner contended that her signature on the first page of the contract was insufficient to bind her 
the arbitration clause printed in a different section of the contract, the court held the homeowner’s 
signature on the contract was sufficient to bind her to all of its terms.
179
 Hooters of America v. Phillips, 173 F. 3d 933 (1999).  Sexual harassment case against restaurant chain 
was not sent to arbitration because restaurant’s procedure was biased in favor of restaurant.
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mutual assent has been found in a variety of ways, and is not limited to the 
traditional views of mutual assent.  
Some defenses to specific performance do not seem to work at all 
against arbitration, while others do not work well.180 Courts do not provide 
protections for the unwary, but do attempt to enforce arbitration clauses to 
specifically perform in spite of legal contract defenses.181  Unconscionability 
and other fairness defenses to contracts are often difficult to prove.182 If the 
parties agree to arbitrate, they are likely to be held to their bargain.183  Courts 
180
 See HILL Supra, FN 153.
181
 Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine:  The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory 
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1040-1047 (1998) See FN 9.
182
 Potts v. Baptist Health System, Inc.,   Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1011234, Dec. 20, 2002.
Nurse filed action against medical center for breach of contract, defamation, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and wrongful termination.  Circuit Court, granted center’s motion 
to compel arbitration.  The Supreme Court, held that:  (1) Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted state 
statute prohibiting enforcement of agreement to submit controversy to arbitration, and (2) circumstances 
surrounding signing of arbitration agreement did not render agreement unconscionable.
Affirmed.
183
 Board of Ed. Of Berkeley County v. W. Harley Miller, Inc.  236 S.E.2d 439 (W.Va. 1977)
The Circuit Court refused to grant motion for summary judgment to enforce award of arbitrators, on 
ground it lacked jurisdiction, and certified jurisdictional question to the Supreme Court of Appeals.  The 
Supreme Court of Appeals, held that:  (1) where parties to a contract agree to arbitrate either all disputes 
or particular limited disputes arising under the contract and where the parties bargained for the arbitration 
provision, arbitration is mandatory and specifically enforceable on motion for summary judgment, and 
any causes of action arising under the contract which by the contract terms are made arbitrable are 
merged, in the absence of fraud, with the arbitration award; (2) arbitration agreement is not “bargained 
for,” so as to be binding and specifically enforceable, in the contract of adhesion situation, or where a 
party can bring arbitration clause within the unconscionability provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, or where arbitration is wholly inappropriate given the nature of the contract and could only have 
been intended to defeat just claims, and (3) arbitration provision in contract between board of education 
and contractor for excavation and removal of rock was specifically enforceable despite contention of 
board that law of arbitration in West Virginia at time it entered into the contract was such as to make the 
whole procedure of arbitration a nullity.  This is the infamous “rabbits”, and “wolves” case, where the 
Supreme Court of Appeals used an animal analogy to support its reasoning in the opinion.  “Wolves” 
vote with “wolves” and “rabbits” vote with “rabbits”, but the other animals must be analyzed as to their 
relationship.
One might conclude that squirrels look like rabbits, wolves look like foxes, and elephants ought 
surely to be impartial.
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can ill afford to spend the time necessary to craft individual relief for each 
aggrieved party in a contract.  The theory of specific performance in 
arbitration has been appealing to modern judges who are overworked, but at 
least in some measure it should appeal to litigants who must wait years in 
the long lines at the courthouse to obtain justice.184
  If a party states they failed to read the contractual terms prior to 
signing, their inattention does not provide a sufficient ground for setting 
aside an agreement to arbitrate.185 Lack of consideration for the arbitration 
clause is usually a losing defense, because most courts have gone out of their 
way to find implied consideration to support the agreement to arbitrate.186
The contracts of adhesion defense does not work unless there is 
As soon as the law attempts to incorporate protections for the unwary in the law of arbitration, then 
the entire purpose of arbitration is defeated.  In the hypothetical above, this is the case where the rabbits 
plead “wolfery” and demand a hearing with full-blown court proceedings, thus avoiding speedy, 
economical, conflict resolution.
184
 See HAAGEN, Supra, FN 181.
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 Tindler v. Pinkerton Security, 305 f. 728 (2002)
Title VII, Employer moved to stay trial proceedings and compel arbitration of dispute.  Employee’s 
affidavit that she never saw brochure introducing binding arbitration program did not raise triable issue 
of fact as to existence of agreement to arbitrate that would preclude compelled arbitration.
Employer’s promise to continue employing an at-will employee could constitute consideration for an 
employee’s promise to forego certain rights.
186
 RAASCH v. NCR Corporation, 254 F.Supp.2d 847 (2003)
On employer’s motion to dismiss action and compel arbitration, the District Court, held that:  (1) 
arbitration agreement between the parties was not invalid for lack of mutuality of obligations; (2) fee-
splitting provision in arbitration agreement, which required employee to pay upfront half the costs of 
arbitration of disputes with employer, was not unconscionable under Ohio law; (3) employer’s promise to 
continue employing at-will employee, and its promise to be bound by terms of arbitration agreement, in 
return for employee’s consideration for agreement; (4) employee’s act of continuing to work for 
employer after employer stated that his doing so would constitute acceptance of arbitration agreement, 
demonstrated employee’s assent to, or acceptance of, terms, and thus agreement was not invalid or 
revocable for lack of acceptance; and (5) arbitration agreement was not invalid contract of adhesion.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that as long as an arbitral forum is provided for vindicating 
statutory rights, there is no moment that the right to vindicate same in a court has been denied.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration.  SUSTAINED.
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accompanying unconscionability.187 The reasonable expectations of the 
parties has worked in some cases, but not in others to set aside the agreement 
to arbitrate.188  Lack of assent often fails to set aside an agreement to 
arbitrate, because courts usually find assent by the parties’ actions.189
Post-Hearing defenses are even more limited than pre-hearing defenses.  
The Federal Arbitration Act provides four grounds upon which an 
arbitrator’s award may be vacated by a court.190 The grounds are as follows:
1. The award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means.
2. Where there was evident partiality or conduct in the arbitrators.
3. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the arbitration hearing, or refusing to hear material 
evidence at the hearing or other violations of parties’ rights.
187
 Torrance v. Aames Funding Corporation, 242f.Supp.2d 862 (2002)
Limitation on damages for UTPA claim would be unconscionable; confidentiality clause would be 
unconscionable; arbitration agreement would be unconscionable due to requirement that mortgagors pay 
arbitrator fees; and unconscionable provisions were nonseverable from arbitration agreement.
Defendant argues that the limitation on damages is enforceable because it applies to both parties.
Requiring payment of arbitrator’s fees, as opposed to reasonable costs, is not permitted as a condition of 
arbitration.  Although the Agreement to Arbitrate permits plaintiffs to recoup those fees should they 
prevail, those fees should not be borne by plaintiffs even if they lose, just as a party is not required to pay 
for the services of the judge regardless of the outcome in court.
188
 Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, LTD 840 P. 2d 1013 (1992).
189
 Lewis Tree Service, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 332 (2002)
On defendant’s motion to compel arbitration with one purchaser, the District Court, held that:  (1) 
arbitration clause in purchase agreement between sellers and purchaser was enforceable with respect to 
purchaser’s claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA); (2) arbitration clause was 
enforceable with respect to all remaining claims, absent showing that purchaser signed agreement under 
circumstances creating unenforceable contract of adhesion; and (3) where all of the purchaser’s claims 
were arbitrable, dismissal of its action, rather than stay, was warranted.
Motion granted.
Because Ironman has not demonstrated that the Purchase Agreement was signed under 
circumstances creating an unenforceable contract of adhesion, the provision requiring all of Ironman’s 
claims to be arbitrated is enforceable.
190
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4. Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.
An arbitration award may be modified on the following grounds:191
1. Evident mistake in the description of anything referred to in the 
award including a material miscalculation of figures.
2. The arbitrators ruled on a matter not submitted to them.
3. The award is imperfect and does not address the merits of the 
controversy.
The essence of these defenses is that unless the award is either illegal or 
the arbitrators engaged in misconduct the award will be affirmed.  Charges 
of the award is not fair, the award is not well reasoned or the award contains 
a few minor errors are all insufficient grounds upon which to set aside an 
award.  Arbitrators are not required to follow the letter of law in crafting 
their awards.192  They are not required to be logical or fair.193
One post-award defense finding a good home in some states is the 
manifest disregard of the law as a ground for vacating an arbitral award.194 A 
decision made by arbitrators who ignored the law can result in an award that 
harms the parties’ rights, rather than protecting those rights.  Although the 
Federal Arbitration Act does not specifically list manifest disregard of the 
191
 9 U.S.C. 11
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 Greenberg v. Bear, Sterns & Co., 220 F.3d 22 (2000).
193
 Id.
194
 Montes v. Shearson Lechman Brothers, 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997) Arbitrator was urged by one 
party to disregard the law.
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law as a ground for vacatur, it does hint at the idea in the first ground under 
undue means.195 Federal courts have allowed this ground, but have limited 
the use of this defense.196
Arbitrator bias has shown some promise as a post-hearing defense.  
Alabama courts use a reasonable impression of partiality standard to review 
awards for bias by the arbitrators.197 However, courts are only willing to set 
aside awards for partiality of the arbitrators when the facts make that 
partiality clear.198 Arbitrators are required to disclose prior conflicts of 
interest.199 Courts avoid creating protections for the unwary and finding bias 
195
 9 U.S.C. 10
196
 John W. Hinchey and Thomas Burch, Georgia Adopts “Manifest Disregard” as a Ground for Vacating 
Arbitration Awards,  9 GA. Bar JOURNAL 11, 14, 16 (February 2004).  Georgia became the first state to 
statutorily adopt manifest disregard of law standard for vacatur of arbitration awards.  However, federal 
courts have placed restrictions on the use of this defense and cases where manifest disregard is alleged 
may require significant proof the arbitrator knew the law and ignored it.
197
 Waverlee Homes v. McMichael, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010966, February 14, 2003. 
Mobile home buyers signed arbitration agreement with mobile home seller.  Mobile home buyers 
brought action against seller for fraud.  Trial court ordered the case to arbitration, and the arbitrator 
entered an award in favor of buyers.  The trial court entered the arbitrator’s award as the judgment in the 
case and denied seller’s motion to set aside the award on ground of bias of the arbitrator.  There was 
evidence that the arbitrator had been co-counsel with buyer’s attorney on a prior case and had made 
similar rulings in favor of the clients of the former co-counsel in other cases.  The Supreme Court held 
this evidence was sufficient to support an inference of bias and that the trial court should have used 
reasonable impression of partiality standard on review of the award.  The Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded with directions.
198
 Forsy International v. Gibbs Oil Company, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (1990)
If an arbitrator’s decision rests on an adequate basis, the failure of the arbitrator to address all the 
issues raised does not render the arbitration fundamentally unfair.  The arbitrator is not bound to hear all 
of the evidence tendered by the parties before rendering award.  The grounds for vacatur are narrow.  
199
 Refining ad Marketing Company v. Stratheros Shipping of Monrovia,761 F. Supp. 293 (1991)
Arbitrators must make full disclosure of possible conflicts of interest.  A party asserting evident 
partiality by an arbitrator has the burden of showing that a reasonable person would conclude the 
arbitrator was biased to one party.
Crow Construction Company v. Jeffrey Brown Assoc., 2003 WL 21221021 (ED. Pa)
Appearance of bias rather than actual bias is the standard to be applied to vacating an award based 
upon alleged bias of the arbitrator.  Arbitrator failed to disclose prior contact with one of the parties and 
appearance of bias was found.
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in every practice by arbitrators.200 California has recently enacted 
requirements that arbitrators disclose their prior dealings with either party to 
an arbitration.201
Many lawyers assert the defense of unconscionable contract in response 
to contracts of adhesion.  However, all contracts of adhesion are not 
unconscionable, but to be deemed unconscionable the contract must contain 
elements of harshness and oppression or inadequate consideration.202  The 
uniform commercial code recognizes two types of unconscionability in UCC 
2-302.203  The two types listed in the UCC are procedural unconscionability 
200
 Board of Ed. Of Berkeley County v. W. Harley Miller, Inc.,  236 S.E.2d 439 (W.Va. 1977)
The Circuit Court refused to grant motion for summary judgment to enforce award of arbitrators, on 
ground it lacked jurisdiction, and certified jurisdictional question to the Supreme Court of Appeals.  The 
Supreme Court of Appeals, held that:  (1) where parties to a contract agree to arbitrate either all disputes 
or particular limited disputes arising under the contract and where the parties bargained for the arbitration 
provision, arbitration is mandatory and specifically enforceable on motion for summary judgment, and 
any causes of action arising under the contract which by the contract terms are made arbitrable are 
merged, in the absence of fraud, with the arbitration award; (2) arbitration agreement is not “bargained 
for,” so as to be binding and specifically enforceable, in the contract of adhesion situation, or where a 
party can bring arbitration clause within the unconscionability provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, or where arbitration is wholly inappropriate given the nature of the contract and could only have 
been intended to defeat just claims, and (3) arbitration provision in contract between board of education 
and contractor for excavation and removal of rock was specifically enforceable despite contention of 
board that law of arbitration in West Virginia at time it entered into the contract was such as to make the 
whole procedure of arbitration a nullity.  This is the infamous “rabbits”, and “wolves” case, where the 
Supreme Court of Appeals used an animal analogy to support its reasoning in the opinion.  “Wolves” 
vote with “wolves” and “rabbits” vote with rabbits, but the other animals must be analyzed as to their 
relationship.
One might conclude that squirrels look like rabbits, wolves look like foxes, and elephants ought 
surely to be impartial.
As soon as the law attempts to incorporate protections for the unwary in the law of arbitration, then 
the entire purpose of arbitration is defeated.  In the hypothetical above, this is the case where the rabbits 
plead “wolfery” and demand a hearing with full-blown court proceedings, thus avoiding speedy, 
economical, conflict resolution.
201
 Cal. Civil Proc. Code 1281.9 requires arbitrators to disclose the arbitrator’s experience over the past five 
years including parties’ names and damages awarded.
202
 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, WEST PUBLISHING, St. Paul (1952)
203
 Joseph D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perrillo, Contracts, WEST GROUP, St. Paul (1999), p 330, 331
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and substantive unconscionability.204  Procedural unconscionability is 
described as unfair surprise, where reasonable people would not expect to 
find unfair terms in the fine print.205  The second type of unconscionability is 
described as oppression or a contract being unfairly balanced toward one 
side.206 The case of Broemer v. Abortion Service of Phoenix207 would be an 
example of procedural unconscionability, whereas the Hooters v. Phillips208
case would be an example of substantive unconscionability.  There is a third 
type of unconscionability which can be drawn from case law, and that is an 
agreement that contains both surprise and oppression.209  Such a case might 
be Engalla v. Permanente,210 here both the procedural and substantive 
elements of unconscionability are combined in one case.  The plaintiff 
alleged fraud, an unfair process and a rigged process to guarantee abnormal 
delays.  Engalla’s Kaiser HMO required him to abide by an arbitration 
agreement when he disputed Kaiser’s handling of his cancer treatment.  The 
Kaiser contract contained numerous procedural “hoops”, but the purpose of 
these “hoops” appeared to be delay.  Kaiser’s contract was so heavily 
204
 Id. at 331.
205
 Id. 
206
 Id. 
207
 Broemer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, 840, p. 2d 1013 (1992)
208
 Hooters of America v. Phillips, 173 F. 3d 933 (1999)
209
 See Calmari & Perillo, Supra, FN 203.
210
 Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, 938 p. 2d 903 (1997)
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weighed in favor of the HMO, Engalla died while endeavoring to comply 
with Kaiser’s procedures.
In order for the defense of fraud to work, it must be asserted against the 
making of the arbitration agreement, and not merely the container contract.  
The Engalla v. Permanente211 court also set aside the arbitration agreement 
on the basis of fraud.  Not only did the defendant in Engalla attempt to hold 
the plaintiff to an unconscionable contract, the court held the defendant 
fraudulently represented the terms of the contract regarding the arbitration 
clause.212  The defendant’s self-administered arbitration process rigged the 
process in favor of the defendant.213  Therefore, if an arbitration plaintiff can 
prove the defendant defrauded the plaintiff in the formation of the agreement 
by misrepresenting the facts or in the process by placing the plaintiff at a 
disadvantage, the plaintiff has a decent chance of setting aside the arbitration 
agreement.
The defense of concealment is the sin of knowing omission rather than 
commission.  Rather than actively misrepresenting a major point upon which 
the aggrieved party detrimentally relied, concealment involves leaving out 
211
 Id.
212
 Id.
213
 Id.
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pertinent facts which should have been disclosed.  If too many facts are 
omitted, then the contract to arbitrate may not be valid and enforceable.214
One-sided obligations in contract language are the basis for the defense 
of inadequacy of consideration.  If the parties do not agree to mutually 
resolve their disputes through the arbitration process, and one side is free to 
pursue litigation, the arbitration clause will likely fail due to inadequacy of 
consideration.215  In such circumstances, consideration will not be implied 
from the conduct of the parties.
Although laches has proven to be a good defense to the specific 
enforcement of  “stale” contracts, it has not gained wide acceptance in the 
field of arbitration law.  Parties have been able to exercise their rights to 
demand arbitration in the middle of litigation, regardless of the laches 
defense.  Laches was actually used against the plaintiff in the Hill Gateway
case.216
CREATIVE STATE LAW DEFENSES TO PRE-DISPUTE 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
Alabama provides the best example for creative state law defenses to 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements mandating specific performance.
214
 Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas v. Amoco Oil Co., 573 F. Supp. 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
215
 Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc. 121 F3d 1126 (1997).
216
 See Hill, Supra, FN 153.
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Alabama Code Section 8-1-41(3) forbids specific performance of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in Alabama contracts.  Thus, Alabama’s public 
policy is anti-pre-dispute arbitration.  Prior to Terminex,217 the courts in 
Alabama understood that interstate contracts were subject to the mandates of 
the FAA.218  Alabama’s Supreme Court used a much narrower interpretation 
than the federal courts of the phrase “a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce.”219  In Alabama, “involving commerce” meant having 
a substantial impact on interstate commerce.220  The Alabama public policy 
against specific performance of pre-dispute arbitration clauses was not 
effectively eradicated by the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Terminex.221   The Alabama Supreme Court continued to look for a way to 
revive the limitations of Ala. Code 8-1-41 (3) and five years post-Terminex 
they discovered it.  In 2000, the Alabama Supreme Court examined the 
United States Supreme Court holding in United States v. Lopez,222 a criminal 
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 Terminex, Supra FN 116.
218
 Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 644 So. 2d 1258 (Ala. 1994)
219
 Terminex, Supra FN  116.
220
 Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1994)
221
 Terminex, Supra, FN 116.
222
 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).  
This criminal case actually had an impact on Alabama arbitration cases.  The Supreme Court held 
that the Commerce Clause is not without limitations, and that making it a federal crime to possess a 
firearm in a local gun free school zone under the Gun-Free School Zone Act exceeded Congress’ 
Commerce Clause authority.  The language used in the opinion indicated the test for determining whether 
an activity falls under Congress’ power to regulate commerce is whether the activity substantially affects 
commerce.  The Supreme Court of Alabama used the language in Lopez to construct a prong test in 
Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company, 775 So.2d 759 2000.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
in Citizen’s Bank v. ALAFABCO, 539 U.S. 52, 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003), specifically disapproved of the 
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case, and used the certain parts of Lopez to craft a five-prong test for specific 
performance of arbitration in Alabama.  The Alabama Supreme Court 
opinion in Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co.223 represented 
a high water mark for creativeness by Alabama’s highest court. 
The Alabama Supreme Court used Lopez language about the Commerce 
Clause as a springboard, but used its own narrow definition of interstate 
commerce to create its test.224   The Sisters of the Visitation opinion was an 
immediate success in Alabama, because it revived Alabama’s comatose 
public policy against pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  Cases which could 
overcome the five-prong test hurdle, were ordered to arbitration under the 
Alabama Supreme Court’s use of Lopez to construct the Sister’s tests, calling the Alabama Court’s 
efforts “misguided.”
223
 Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So. 2d 759 (2000).  A Mobile, Alabama, 
monastery engaged a Mobile plastering company to perform repairs on the wall and ceiling of the 
monastery’s chapel.  The repair work did not go as anticipated and allegedly resulted in damage to the 
ceiling’s decorative paintings.  The monastery demanded arbitration under its contract with Cochran, and 
Cochran sued the monastery for an injunction to stop the arbitration.  The United States Supreme Court 
in the United States v. Lopez, (see previous footnote) ruled that Congress’ commerce power was not 
unlimited.  The Alabama used that case to develop a five prong test to determine whether a set of case 
facts have a substantial impact on interstate commerce.  The tests were:
1. Citizenship of Parties;
2. Tools and equipment used on the project;
3. Allocation of costs and materials;
4. Subsequent movement across state lines; and 
5. Degree of separability from other contracts.
The Alabama court found the parties were citizens of Alabama, no substantial effect on interstate 
commerce resulted from the purchase and use of the tools and equipment by Cochran, no out of state 
workers or materials were used by Cochran, nothing subsequently moved across state lines because the 
work site was fixed in Alabama, and the monastery’s other contracts with out of state residents were 
separable from the contract with Cochran.  For those reasons, the Alabama Supreme Court elected to 
enforce Ala. Code 8-1-41(3) and prohibit enforcement of the arbitration agreement.  This case created 
two streams of cases in Alabama.  One stream affirmed arbitration under the FAA, and the other stream 
denied arbitration under Ala. Code 8-1-41(3).  The Sisters five-prong test was used to determine whether 
the case was arbitrated or litigated.  In the summer of 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the 
Sisters five prong test in Citizen’s Bank v. Alafabco, 123 S.ct. 2037 (2003).
224
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authority of the Federal Arbitration Act, while the cases which failed the 
five-prong hurdle test, remained in litigation under Ala. Code 8-1-41(3).225
Sisters created two streams of Alabama arbitration cases:  one stream 
allegedly involved strictly state law matters that did not “substantially” 
impact interstate commerce and were governed by Ala. Code 8-1-41(3) 
while the other stream involved cases with significant interstate commerce 
contracts that “affected” commerce, were governed by the FAA and were 
ordered to arbitration.226  Alabama plaintiffs who could demonstrate that all 
five hurdles were not met were allowed to litigate.  Defendants who could 
get over all five hurdles imposed by Sisters of the Visitation were allowed to 
obtain an order for specific performance of arbitration.
There is a long list of cases on both sides of the Sisters opinion, but a 
few are included in this article to demonstrate how the Alabama courts used 
their own interpretation of “affecting” commerce.  The Alabama case of 
Huntsville Utilities v. Consolidated Construction Company227 resulted in a 
225
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226
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 Huntsville Utilities v. Consolidated Construction Company, Supreme Court of Alabama, May 23, 2003.  
A Delaware general contractor subcontracted a roofing project in Huntsville, Alabama to a 
Tennessee contractor doing business in Alabama.  The Tennessee contractor subcontracted the work to 
an Alabama contractor.  Huntsville Utilities was sued by the general contractor for non-payment, 
negligence, fraud and a variety of other allegations.  Huntsville Utilities moved to compel arbitration.  
The trial court denied the motion holding only Alabama transactions were involved.  The Supreme Court 
of Alabama affirmed using the prong test set out in Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering 
Company, 775 So. 2d 759 (2000).  Justice See dissented, and the language of his dissent in this case 
bears a close resemblance to the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Citizens Bank v. 
ALAFABCO, 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003).  Justice See opined that the Alabama Supreme Court erred in the 
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denial of arbitration, while the Alabama case of Parkway Dodge v. 
Hawkins228 resulted in an order to arbitrate.  In some instances, the five-
prong hurdle test was not applied due to the nature of the case.  For example, 
Health Insurance Corporation of Alabama v. Smith229 by-passed the Sisters
prong test because an insurance policy issued in another state obviously 
passed over all the hurdles and involved interstate commerce.  Sears Termite 
& Pest Control v. Robinson230 avoided the Sisters test, because it was 
decided by declaring the contract unconscionable based upon a limitation of 
damages clause. National Auction Group, Inc. v. Hammett231 was decided by 
Sisters opinion by imposing a narrow view of involving interstate commerce contrary to the broader view 
of affecting commerce set forth in Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson 513 U.S. 265 (1995).  This case was 
effectively overturned by ALAFABCO which overturned Sisters.
228
 Parkway Dodge v. Hawkins, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010898, February 7, 2003.   
Car buyer brought action against car dealer for suppression and misrepresentation regarding sales 
transaction containing arbitration agreement, credit life insurance and a service contract.  The car dealer 
moved to compel arbitration and the trial court granted the motion.  Supreme Court held that car buyers 
purchase of out of state insurance and a service contract with an out of state company were sufficient 
interstate commerce contracts under the FAA.  The arbitration agreement arose from the same transaction 
and could not be treated as a separate contract involving only Alabama law.  
229
 Health Insurance Corporation of Alabama v. Smith, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010570, 
April 11, 2003. 
 Reversing the trial court’s denial of motion to compel arbitration of a fraud action based on 
insurance policies, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the sale of insurance policies substantially 
affects interstate commerce.  The court held that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in an insurance 
policy is enforceable under the FAA even thought the policy holders purchased the policies from an in-
state insurance agency.  The policies were issued in Washington and mailed to the Alabama policy-
holders.  This opinion by Justice See marked a departure for the Alabama Supreme Court from the 
analysis previously used in Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company 775 So. 2d 759 
(2000).
230
 Sears Termite & Pest Control v. Robinson, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 102034, May 23, 2003.  
The trial court denied Sears motion to compel arbitration because the Sears contract limited the 
homeowner’s damages in arbitration and was, therefore, unconscionable.  The Alabama Supreme court 
held that limitation of damages language does not render an arbitration clause unenforceable.  Although 
the homeowner contended that her signature on the first page of the contract was insufficient to bind her 
the arbitration clause printed in a different section of the contract, the court held the homeowner’s 
signature on the contract was sufficient to bind her to all of its terms.
231
 National Auction Group, Inc. v. Hammett, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1012145, January 31, 
2003. 
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ordinary contract law (privity) and it was not necessary to apply the Sisters 
prong test.  McDonald v. H & S Homes, LLC and Olympia232 turned on the 
trial court’s substitution of AAA rules for the agreed upon rules in the 
parties contract.  Some Alabama cases that had been ordered to arbitration 
were later set-aside on grounds of bias of the arbitrators,233 while other 
Alabama opinions clarified trial court orders that were somewhat 
ambiguous.234
 Homeowner purchased condominium at an auction.  The homeowner’s problems with the Auction 
Group could not be resolved, and the homeowner sued the Auction Group for fraud and negligence in the 
sale of the condominium.  The Auction Group moved to compel arbitration via an arbitration agreement 
signed by condominium owner’s association.  The homeowner was not a signatory to that agreement and 
the court held the homeowner could not be bound by it.  
232
 McDonald v. H & S Homes, LLC and Olympia, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1011805, January 
10, 2003.  
Manufactured home buyer sued manufactured home seller and its general manager for 
misrepresentation, negligence and conversion.  The language of the retail installment contract signed at 
time of sale required arbitration, and that arbitrator(s) be selected by the assignee of retail installment 
contract with consent of buyer.  The trial court ordered arbitration, but also ordered the arbitrator(s) be 
selected jointly by buyer and seller using the rules of the American Arbitration Association.  The 
Supreme Court held that arbitration was proper, but the trial court’s order as to the manner in which the 
selection of arbitrator(s) took place was inconsistent with terms of the arbitration agreement.  The case 
was remanded with instructions.
233
 Waverlee Homes v. McMichael, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010966, February 14, 2003. 
 Mobile home buyers signed arbitration agreement with mobile home seller.  Mobile home buyers 
brought action against seller for fraud.  Trial court ordered the case to arbitration, and the arbitrator 
entered an award in favor of buyers.  The trial court entered the arbitrator’s award as the judgment in the 
case and denied seller’s motion to set aside the award on ground of bias of the arbitrator.  There was 
evidence that the arbitrator had been co-counsel with buyer’s attorney on a prior case and had made 
similar rulings in favor of the clients of the former co-counsel in other cases.  The Supreme Court held 
this evidence was sufficient to support an inference of bias and that the trial court should have used 
reasonable impression of partiality standard on review of the award.  The Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded with directions.
234
 Cavalier Manufacturing v. Clarke, et. al., Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1011012, 1011014, 
1011106, April 25, 2003.  
Mobile home buyers brought actions against dealers and manufacturer in negligence, intentional 
misrepresentation and breach of warranty.  The parties were ordered by the circuit court to arbitrate and 
the dealers and manufacturer appealed contending the trial court ordered arbitration under the wrong 
agreement.  In essence, the defendants sought to have the arbitration conducted under the contract which 
contained more limited damages than the other contracts.  In a per curium decision, the Alabama 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order as to all but one defendant, and directed the trial court to 
order arbitration with that defendant under the contract applicable to it.  In affirming the trial court, the 
Alabama Supreme Court held that when defendants prepare and execute multiple contracts with a 
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Occasionally, the Alabama Supreme Court remanded cases back to a 
circuit court to determine whether there was an agreement to arbitrate.235
The Supreme Court of Alabama occasionally used the separability doctrine 
to decide a case, and compelled the parties to arbitrate because an allegation 
of fraud in the inducement was not against the arbitration agreement, but 
against the contract as a whole.236 The Alabama Supreme Court held that 
intentional torts fall outside the commerce clause in Ex Parte Webb237 and 
should not be ordered to arbitration. The Alabama court revisited Terminix 
consumer and those contracts contain ambiguities, the ambiguities will be construed against the 
defendants.  In this case, all of the contracts contained arbitration clauses, but some were more favorable 
to the defendants.
235
 Mountain Heating and Cooling v. Van Tassel-Proctor Inc., Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 
1011835, May 2, 2003.  
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and remanded this case to the circuit court to determine 
whether language in the contract between a subcontractor and contractor formed an agreement to 
arbitrate.  The arbitration clause stated the parties agreed to “settle” their disputes through arbitration.  
The Alabama Supreme Court held that the words “settle” and “arbitrate” are contradictory terms, and the 
case was remanded to the circuit court for a jury trial on whether the parties intended to arbitrate.  The 
court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court in Mountain Heating and Cooling v. Van Tassel-Proctor, 
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals case No. 201 0333, June 14, 2002, and held that “settled by arbitration” 
was an agreement to arbitrate.  Justice Yates dissent in that opinion formed the basis of the per curium 
opinion in the Alabama Supreme Court case.  Justice See dissented with the per curium opinion pointing 
out that the word “settle” instead of the word “resolve” should not render the arbitration agreement 
ambiguous, because the word “settle” does not create doubt as to the parties’ intentions.  
236
 Johnson Mobile Homes v. Hathcock, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1992310, February 21, 2003.
This mobile home fraud, negligence and bad faith case was filed in a circuit court which denied the 
seller’s motion to compel arbitration.  The Supreme Court of Alabama found no allegation of fraud 
against the arbitration clause, but an allegation of fraud in the procurement of the container contract.  The 
seller was within its rights to compel arbitration against the buyer who signed the arbitration agreement.  
The co-purchaser who did not sign the arbitration agreement was not compelled to arbitrate.  Fraud in the 
inducement of the container contract is arbitrable.
237
 Ex Parte Webb, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No 1000651, February 21, 2003
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial courts grant of arbitration for this intentional tort 
case, holding that intentional torts are not contemplated within the Commerce Clause.  Justice See 
dissented based upon the intentional tort at issue arising from an employment situation covered by an 
employment agreement containing an arbitration clause.  This case would probably be reversed under 
current law due to Citizens Bank v. ALAFABCO 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003).
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in Orkin Exterminating Co. Inc. v. Larkin238 but held that the arbitration 
agreement did not cover claims that pre-existed the agreement. The Alabama 
Supreme Court also held that tort claims falling outside the contract 
agreement are not arbitrable.239
One of the more interesting issues dealt with by the Alabama Supreme 
Court was reported in Cook’s Pest Control v. Rebar.240 The homeowners in 
238
 Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Larkin, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1012181, March 7, 2003.
The facts in this case are remarkably similar to the facts in Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson 513 
U.S. 265 (1995), except that in Terminex the controversy arose after the agreement was in effect, and in 
this case the controversy arose before the termite agreement was in effect.  The Alabama Supreme Court 
held that contract principles governed, and pre-dispute arbitration agreements could not govern matters 
arising before the pre-dispute arbitration agreement became effective.  The controversy centered around a 
wood inspection report by Orkin that was prepared prior to the Larkin’s assuming an existing termite 
agreement.  In Terminex, the problem arose after Dobson assumed the termite agreement with Terminex.  
This case is questionable law due to its interpretation of pre-contract related issues as separate 
transactions.
239
 Lee L. Saad Construction Company, Inc. v. DPF Architects, P.C., Court of Alabama Case No. 1010505.  
Nov. 27, 2002.
Contractor filed action against architects, structural engineers, and electrical engineers, alleging 
breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligence, and intentional interference with a contractual 
relationship.  Circuit Court, granted summary judgment for defendants.  The Supreme Court, held that (1) 
contractor’s tort claims were not within scope of submission to arbitration in dispute with project owner 
and thus res judicata did not bar contractor from asserting those claims; (2) arbitrator did not actually 
decide that defendants were not responsible for wrongful acts that contractor alleged and thus collateral 
estoppel did not apply; (3) doctrine of satisfaction of judgment, based on arbitration award, did not bar 
claims; and (4) structural engineer’s affidavit addressing merits of claims shifted burden to contractor for 
producing evidence in support of its claims.
Tort claims were not within scope of submission to arbitration in dispute, and thus res judicata did 
not bar contractor from asserting those claims in subsequent action.  Arbitration clause was 
unambiguously limited to matters concerning interpretation of contract of breach of contract.
240
 Cook’s Pest Control, Inc. v. Rebar, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 
1010897, Dec. 13, 2002.
Home owners brought action against pest control for company’s alleged failure to treat and control 
termite infestation and repair damage.  Company brought motion to compel arbitration, and the Circuit 
Court, denied the motion.  The Supreme Court, held that:  (1) home owners were not attempting 
unilaterally to modify an existing contract when they submitted addendum along with contract renewal 
fee which eliminated company’s right to arbitrate disputes; (2) company’s continued service and 
treatment and acceptance of renewal fee constituted an acceptance of the addendum; and (3) agency 
principles did not preclude company’s adoption of the addendum.
Affirmed.
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that case sent an envelope stuffer to the pest control company containing an 
addendum, which allegedly relieved them from a duty to arbitrate their 
claims under the contract. The trial court upheld the validity of the 
homeowner’s addendum and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.241  The 
Alabama court reasoned that if businesses can impose a duty to arbitrate 
through a unilateral change in terms, a customer should be allowed to 
modify the contract in the same way.
Although the Alabama court continued to rule on exceptional cases 
such as the ones cited in the previous paragraphs on a case-by-case basis, the 
Sisters five prong hurdle test was utilized to decide cases involving regular 
in-state contracts containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause.242 The Sisters
Pest control company’s continued service was an acceptance of modifications to that agreement 
which home owners’ proposed through addendum which differed materially from those proposed by 
company in its renewal offer.  Company did not make counter-offer to the proposed addendum.
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 For cases affirming the FAA’s mandate to arbitrate and passing the Sisters five prong hurdle test see the 
following:
Health Insurance Corporation of Alabama v. Smith, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010570, April 
11, 2003. 
 Reversing the trial court’s denial of motion to compel arbitration of a fraud action based on 
insurance policies, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the sale of insurance policies substantially 
affects interstate commerce.  The court held that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in an insurance 
policy is enforceable under the FAA even thought the policy holders purchased the policies from an in-
state insurance agency.  The policies were issued in Washington and mailed to the Alabama policy-
holders.  This opinion by Justice See marked a departure for the Alabama Supreme Court from the 
analysis previously used in Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company 775 So. 2d 759 
(2000).
McGuffey Health and Rehabilitation Center v. Gibson and Jackson, Alabama Supreme Court Case 
1020289, May 9, 2003.  
Justice Houston’s majority opinion continued the current Alabama Supreme Court’s departure from 
the Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company, 775 So. 2d 759 (2000) tests relied upon in 
2000, 2001 and 2002 opinions by the Alabama Supreme Court.  This medical malpractice case against a 
nursing home reached the Alabama Supreme Court via a denial by the circuit court of a motion to compel 
arbitration.  In reversing the trial court, the Alabama Supreme Court held that Medicare funds moving 
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test continued until the summer of 2003, when the U.S. Supreme Court dealt 
with the Sisters test in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco.243 The U.S. Supreme Court 
called Alabama’s attempt to limit the effect of the words “in commerce” in 
across state lines to pay for the plaintiffs care must be considered in establishing a necessary nexus to 
interstate commerce.  Therefore, the admissions arrangement had a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.  The court also opined that in addition to the admissions agreement the equipment and 
supplies used to treat the plaintiffs moved across state lines.
Huntsville Utilities et al v. Consolidated Construction Company, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 
1020195, May 23, 2003
General contractor brought action against corporation, two of its employees, and its architect, 
alleging negligence, breach of warranty, fraud, violation of Prompt Pay Act, and other claims.  Circuit 
Court denied corporations and its employee’s motion to compel arbitration.  The Supreme Court held 
that:  (1) renovation transaction from which dispute arose had to have a substantial impact on interstate 
commerce in order to trigger Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); (2) renovation did not substantially impact 
interstate commerce, and thus trial court could not compel arbitration pursuant to FAA; and (3) 
corporation’s acquisition of out-of-state materials for renovation, as opposed to contractor’s acquisition 
of such materials, was relevant to determining what portion of contract price was allocable to interstate 
versus intrastate commerce, for purposes of determining whether renovation triggered FAA.
Bowen v. Security Pest ControlL, Inc.  Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010783, Feb. 28, 2003
Homeowners sued termite extermination contractor, asserting numerous claims.  Contractor filed 
motion to compel arbitration.  Circuit Court granted contractor’s motion.  The Supreme Court held that 
contractor failed to establish that transaction substantially affected interstate commerce, as was required 
to enforce written arbitration agreement under Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
Reversed and remanded.  This case used the Sisters test.
Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010783, February 28, 2003
This case upheld the five-prong Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company test.  See 
775 So. 2d 759 (Ala 2000).  Justice See dissented and his dissent closely tracked the reasoning of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco 539 U.S. 52, 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003), which overruled 
Sisters five-prong test.  The facts of Bowen v. Security Pest Control were similar to the facts in Allied-
Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (195), in which the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Alabama 
Supreme Court’s denial of arbitration based on Ala. Code 8-1-41(3).  This case is no longer good law due 
to ALAFABCO’s effect on Sister’s.
Ala. Sup. Ct. Case No. 1010703, August 30, 2002.  This case held that a debt restructuring agreement 
failed to meet the test of Sisters and was not a transaction that affected interstate commerce.  The reversal 
of this case by the U.S. Supreme Court put an end to the Sisters test.  
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 Citizens Bank v. ALAFABCO, 539 U.S. 52, 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003).  The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated 
its opinion in Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), that the terms “involving 
commerce” in the FAA are the functional equivalent of “affecting commerce” under the Commerce 
Clause.  Therefore, the terms “involving commerce” should be given the broadest reading permissible 
under the exercise of the Commerce Clause.  This case specifically dealt with the “misguided” reasoning 
behind Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran 775 So. 2d 759 (2000), and overruled the Sisters prong test.  
The Supreme Court of Alabama in ALAFABCO v. Citizens Bank, Ala. Sup. Ct. Case No. 1010703, 
August 30, 2002, had held that a debt restructuring agreement between a builder and a bank did not have 
a sufficient relation to a transaction affecting interstate commerce to be governed by the FAA using the 
Sisters prong test analysis.  The United States Supreme Court reversed holding that the FAA 
encompasses a wider range of transactions than those actually “in commerce.”  This case overturned 
Sisters and its progeny and limited the application of ALA. Code 8-1-41(3) dramatically.
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Sisters was “misguided.”244 The Sisters test and Alabama’s two streams of 
cases were effectively “killed” by Citizens Bank v. Alafabco.245 It remains to 
be seen if the Alabama judiciary will concede that Ala. Code Section 8-1-
41(3) is a dead statute, or if some other creative attempt will be made to 
revive it in another form.  
The costs to specifically perform in arbitration have long been debated 
by business lawyers and plaintiff’s counsel.246 A 2000 Alabama case that 
went to the U.S. Supreme Court almost addressed that issue.  Green Tree 
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph247 side-stepped the direct issue of 
costs for the consumer in arbitration, but addressed it indirectly by holding 
the court would have considered the issue had the consumer attached proof 
that the costs of arbitration would have kept her from pursuing her truth in 
lending claims in the arbitration forum. This case led to a new procedure for 
244
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245
 Id.
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 J. Clark Kelso, Thomas J. Stipanowich, Protecting Consumers In Arbitration, DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION MAGAZINE, Fall 1998
There are three great justifications by business for arbitration, to wit:  It saves on enormous litigation 
expenses, it virtually eliminates runaway verdicts and punitive damage awards and it unburdens the court 
system.  For business interests arbitration is predictable, controllable and less costly, but is it just another 
form of tort reform?  Is it impartial between business and consumers?  Is the cost allocation in arbitration 
between consumers and business fair?  Can lawyers who represent business in their practice serve as fair 
and impartial arbitrators?
247
 Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).  The court decided the case based 
upon whether a party’s claims being ordered to arbitration accompanied by a dismissal of the court action 
regarding those claims is a final decision under the Federal Arbitration Act.  The court held that such was 
the case.  The court also touched upon whether the silence of the arbitration agreement regarding costs of 
arbitration made the agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.  The court held that silence regarding costs 
and fees did not make the agreement unenforceable.  There was no proof in the record of the amount of 
the costs and fees and the court declined to rule on prohibitive costs without proof.
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attorneys challenging the costs of arbitration. Attorneys began attaching 
affidavits regarding the costs of arbitration to their complaints in Alabama, 
in an effort to prove that arbitration was a cost-prohibitive forum.248 The 
costs of performance in consumer arbitration continues to be a “core 
defense” with consumer groups and plaintiff’s attorneys.249
WHY IS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE UNDER THE FAA RESISTED BY 
CONSUMER GROUPS AND PROMOTED BY BUSINESS INTERESTS?
The answer may be that consumer groups perceive any advantage for 
business as a disadvantage for consumers.250 This view does not 
acknowledge the benefits of arbitration for the consumer, such as reduced 
expenses, time savings, speedy payment of awards and lower attorney fees.  
The answer to the controversy may lie in the perspectives of consumer 
groups and plaintiffs’ lawyers regarding arbitration. Their view is radically 
different from the view of those in the business community.251  The business 
community does not view arbitration as a means to cheat customers.  For 
businesses, arbitration is a process that allows less risk at less cost than 
litigation.  The consumer is a non-issue in the business perspective on 
arbitration.
248
 The author of this article received several phone calls inquiring about such affidavits.
249
 See CAPPALLI. Supra, FN 26.
250
 See KELSO, Supra, FN 246.
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A television commercial for a brand of treated lumber bearing a yellow 
tag may be analogous to some of the questions currently being raised about 
consumer arbitration.252 The commercial begins with the representative of 
the lumber company pitching his company’s new slogan by giving away 
yellow T-shirts containing the words, “yellow fever – catch it!”253 The 
lumber person is perplexed because no one wants the T-shirts, and he asks a 
famous football player who also appears in the commercial, “why are the T-
shirts not being well received?” The football player responds, “It’s a disease, 
Jimmy!”254
Arbitration is viewed by the business community as a process which 
allows a jury trial to be avoided and replaced by specific performance under 
an agreement to arbitrate.  The business community’s perspective on the 
avoidance of a jury trial is that it is a good thing.255 The business community 
views arbitration as a method to escape the cost of litigation.  The business 
perspective appears to be at odds with the perspectives of consumer groups 
and plaintiffs’ lawyers who believe that escaping litigation is a very bad 
252
 Television commercial for Great Southern Wood Treatment Company featured company spokesman 
“Jimmy” and former quarterback Archie Manning.
253
 Id.
254
 Id.
255
 John Wilkinson, Streamlining Arbitration of the Complex Case, DISPUTE RESOLUTION JOURNAL, 
August/October 2000 Businesses realize arbitration is faster and more efficient than litigation.  It tends to 
produce fair and impartial results.
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thing.256 The business leaders view arbitration as a process which can be 
utilized to avoid potential financial disaster, while consumer groups and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers view consumer arbitration as a process which can be used 
by the business community to avoid responsibility.  In other words, the 
arbitration process is the equivalent of a “disease” to consumer advocates.257
These two divergent views of consumer arbitration appear to be incapable of 
reconciliation. Consumer advocates and those in the business community 
appear unlikely to acknowledge the merits of each other’s perspectives 
regarding arbitration.258
In most jurisdictions there has been little effort to negotiate a middle 
ground between the consumer and business views regarding arbitration.  
Consumer arbitration has become a battleground where each side has 
asserted a “winner take all” position.259  Federal court and state court views 
256
 See FOHMY.  Supra, FN 72.
257
 A. Brooke Overby, An Institutional Analysis of Consumer Law, 34 VAND. J. TRANNA’TL L. 1219 
1276-1283 (2001)
The methods and mechanisms available to resolve consumer disputes varies greatly from state to 
state.  Attitudes regarding these processes and their enforceability also differ from one jurisdiction to the 
next.  The U.S. and the European Union use arbitration to resolve consumer disputes, but in the U.S. 
arbitration has become a hotly contested area in contract law and federalism.  The U.S. federal courts 
have rejected the contemplation of the parties test to determine assent to waive the constitutional right to 
access to the judicial system.  The general contract law principles have also been limited by federal 
decisions in favor of arbitration.  There is hostility toward arbitration and denial of access to the courts, 
but it appears the access to justice issues involved may be subject to attitudes regarding social policy and 
contract law policy.  Federalism and consumer values become intertwined in the access to justice issues 
involved with binding arbitration.
258
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259
 Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens Door to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers, 71 
NOV FLA. B.J. 8 (1997)
Professor Sternlight questioned the legal reasoning behind the Hill v. Gateway decision from the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  Placing a binding arbitration clause in shipping documents inside a 
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also conflict on this issue.  State court judges, who are elected, seem more
receptive to limitations being placed ordering specific performance of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in consumer cases.  Federal judges, who are 
appointed, are more inclined to expand the use of consumer arbitration in 
accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions.  As a result of these 
diametrically opposed positions on consumer arbitration, it has become one 
of the most hotly contested areas of law.  The focus of the battle appears to 
be the solidified positions of the parties, rather than their true interests.260
Consumer arbitration can be distinguished from other types of 
arbitration due to the disparity of skill levels between the major 
participants.261  In labor arbitration powerful unions are pitted against 
business representatives and in commercial business arbitration sophisticated 
business representatives are pitted against each other.262 However, in 
consumer arbitration, sophisticated business owners are arbitrating against 
product box, and requiring the consumer to read it and return the product or be bound by the arbitration 
agreement seems to call into question the basic principle of contract law.  The transaction for the sale of 
the product did not include an arbitration agreement.  The agreement was added at the time of delivery.
260
 Jeremy Senderowicy, Consumer Arbitration and Freedom of Contract:  A proposal to facilitate 
consumers’ informed consent to arbitration clauses in form contracts, 32 COLUMN. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBO. 275, 277, 286 (1999).  
Adhesion contracts are a common feature of service contracts, and most adhesion contracts are 
drafted by companies who are familiar with the advantages of arbitration.  Repeat players likely 
disadvantage the consumers by writing out undesirable elements such as primitive damages, and writing 
in waiver of procedural safe guards.  Forum selection in these contracts also poses a major hurdle for the 
unwary consumer.
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normally less sophisticated consumers.263 The businesses are armed with 
“take it or leave it” contracts of adhesion, while the consumers are armed 
with “yes” or “no.”264 The consumer can either accept the arbitration 
agreements as written or shop elsewhere for products or services.265 The 
underlying interests of selling products and purchasing products gets lost in 
a power struggle over terms and conditions of dispute resolution before a 
dispute ever arises.
  Changes occur often in this field of law as a result of the ever-
increasing body of case law.  Some of the lower court cases appear to create 
new issues, while most of the U.S. Supreme court cases settle old ones.266
There appears to be no end in sight for the final resolution of this high stakes 
controversy.  The business interests allege millions of dollars are at stake, 
and consumer groups contend basic guaranteed rights are at risk.267 In the 
middle of the fray are contract law and equity, which may be forever altered 
by the far-reaching principles set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
263
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264
 Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts:  Consumer Protection and the 
Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DE PAUL L. REV. 1191, 1220-1252 (2001)
Consumers don’t get to bargain for the exclusion of an arbitration clause from a contract of 
adhesion.  Even though the arbitration clauses are often hidden in fine print in an obscure portion of the 
contract, the courts routinely hold such clauses valid.  The concealment of these arbitration clauses and 
the subsequent enforcement of arbitration under than begs the question of informed waiver of rights and 
adequate procedural safeguards.  Was it the intent of congress to allow consumer’s rights to the judicial 
system to be eliminated in adhesion contracts?  Consumers are at an obvious disadvantage in these 
contracts, so should Congress amend the FAA to protect consumers?
265
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 See REUBEN, Supra, FN 25.
267
 Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine:  The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory 
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1040-1047 (1998) See FN 9.
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interpretations of contract law and specific performance as applicable to pre-
dispute arbitration clauses under the FAA.
CAN THE MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE SURVIVE?  REALITY v. 
THEORY:
How well does the reality of specific performance of binding pre-
dispute arbitration agreements measure up to the theory of arbitration?  In 
order to answer that question with any degree of accuracy one must not only 
look at the efficiency of the process but also take into account the results 
parties obtain when using specific performance to carry out binding 
arbitration contracts.268 If arbitration and litigation are really “separate but 
equal” forums how do arbitration awards compare to jury verdicts in similar 
cases?  Why are class actions and punitive damages routinely excluded from 
arbitration if the process of arbitration is equal to litigation?269 Given the fact 
that litigation is a public process with readily available statistical data 
regarding results obtained in trials, and given the fact that arbitration is a 
268
 F. Paul Bland, Jr., Some Winning Arguments for Consumers Resisting Mandatory Arbitration Abuse 
ATLA Annual Convention Materials, VOLUME 2, July 2002
Bland discusses arbitrator conflicts of interest and the unconscionable nature of some arbitration 
agreements.  He cites clear examples of unconscionability in contracts heavily weighted toward business, 
and those that lack mutuality of obligation.  Bland criticizes decisions barring class actions from 
arbitration because they leave consumers as a group with no remedy.
269
 Richard B. Cappalli, Arbitration of Consumer Claims:  The Sad Case of Two-Time Victim Terry 
Johnson or Where Have You Gone Learned Hand?  BOSTON PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL 
367-376 Summer 2001 See FN 26.
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private process with little available research data, the task of obtaining 
reliable data for comparison purposes is next to impossible.  
The theory behind the FAA has changed through the years.  Although 
the FAA started out as procedural, not substantive law, Federal decisions in 
this area of the law in the past fifty years have held the FAA is substantive 
law applicable to every court in the land.270 Some of these opinions state that 
the FAA has always been a substantive law act designed to overcome 
judicial hostility, because that was the original intent of Congress.271
However, a review of the hearings held on the Federal Arbitration Act 
before its passage make it clear that the drafters of the arbitration act 
intended it to be an Article III procedural act applicable only in federal 
courts.272 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has brought the original procedural 
270
 Hamilton Life Insurance Company of New York v. Republic National Life Insurance Company 291 F. 
Supp. 225 (1968)
The Texas Arbitration Act did not qualify under the McCarran-Ferguson Act as the regulation of 
insurance by a state.  Therefore, the FAA pre-empts the Texas Arbitration Act.  This arbitration principle 
remains good law.  In order for the McCarran-Ferguson Act to make the FAA inapplicable under the 
regulation of insurance by a state, the state statute much specifically govern only insurance and not other 
types of contracts in addition to insurance. The statute in this case was a general arbitration act that 
governed all contracts and preserved the jurisdiction of state courts over business matters.  The case also 
held that if fraud is alleged in the formation of the container contract that matter is to be decided by 
arbitrators.  If fraud is alleged to have formed the basis for the arbitration clause separately from the 
container contract, that is a matter for the courts.
271
 See Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1.  Congress intended to use the FAA to stop any state legislative 
attempts to make arbitration unenforceable.
272
 David H. Taylor and Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure By Contract:  A Convoluted Confluence of Private 
Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1133-
1145 (2002)
Due to the increasing utilization of pre-litigation agreements the traditional views of contract law 
have been turned upside down.  Some have charged that judges have allowed their own self-interests in 
docket management overcome their concern for the rights of litigants.  Forum selection clauses such as 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses are an about face for the judiciary.  Enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses rests upon judge created interpretations of the FAA.  The federal courts have used the FAA and 
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nature of the Federal Arbitration Act to the attention of her fellow justices on 
the United States Supreme Court on at least two occasions.273 The origin of 
the Federal Arbitration Act no longer appears to be an important factor in the 
theory analysis utilized by the U.S. Supreme Court in arbitration decisions.  
Supreme Court decisions have blurred the line between theory and 
reality in arbitration to such an extent that it may no longer be possible to 
distinguish between the two.  Cases like Citizens Bank v. ALAFABCO274 and 
Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson275 give rise to the assertion that theory is 
reality in cases subject to the Federal Arbitration Act mandates on specific 
performance.  In other words, a substantive justice theoretically equal to that 
achieved in litigation is assumed by compelling specific performance of 
arbitration agreements.  Binding arbitration will be enforced by federal 
courts regardless of any realities associated with unjust outcomes.276
Congress has not acted to repeal or limit the Federal Arbitration Act in 
the Commerce Clause to create a body of law that could be described as judicial legislation, and this 
favorable body of law has resulted in the proliferation of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  The courts 
have refused to revisit the legislative history of the FAA and have become pro-arbitration.  The FAA was 
a creature of Congress’ Article III authority, but recently has become the enforcer of the Commerce 
Clause through judicial slight of hand.  The authors urge Congress to take a second look at the current 
mess and endeavor to establish some guidelines for enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
under the FAA.
273
 See TERMINEX, Supra FN 116. 513 US. 265 Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion.  See also her 
dissent in 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
274
 Citizens Bank v. ALAFABCO, 539 U.S. 52, 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003).  
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 Allied-Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
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 F. Paul Bland, Jr., See FN 268.
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response to the federal decisions favoring binding arbitration.277 Federal 
courts are quick to point out that they must be correctly interpreting the 
intent of Congress regarding the scope, application and enforcement of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, because Congress has not acted to revise or repeal 
the Federal Arbitration Act following these federal decisions.  
The Clinton impeachment hearings revealed the United States Congress 
is filled with politicians who have a tendency to vote along partisan lines.  
There are also groups of politicians who normally cast their votes 
consistently with the goals of their constituency.  A senator from a 
manufacturing state may be more likely to vote for bills favoring the 
interests of business than a senator from a predominantly rural state.  There 
is enough balance in the U.S. Congress between the parties and the interest 
groups to allow substantial delays in the passage of legislation that is not 
bipartisan in nature.  Substantial changes to the Federal Arbitration Act have 
been proposed from time to time, but the supporters of these changes were 
unable to muster enough support to effect passage of their proposed 
legislation.  To state that the U.S. Congress could and would pass legislation 
277
 Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims:  Has Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration 
Outlived its Welcome?,  40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1080-1092 (1998)
State statutes which restrict or limit the use of arbitration clauses are preempted by the FAA.  
Contract defenses to arbitration clauses are different to prove and are unavailable in most cases.  Public 
policy defenses do not work due to the favorable status granted to arbitration by the federal courts.  The 
article urges the FAA be amended to permit judicial review of statutory claims which would require 
arbitrators to prepare a written rationale for the award.
80
to limit, revise or repeal the Federal Arbitration Act if it were unhappy with 
federal court decisions interpreting the FAA mandates is a statement with 
little merit, even though it is based on a generally recognized principle of 
separation of powers in the three branches of government.  It often takes 
congress years, if not decades, to address and correct perceived activism by 
the federal judiciary.
Binding arbitration agreements are becoming more common in modern 
sales contracts between businesses and customers.  Specific performance in 
consumer arbitration remains a hybrid creature of contract and equity.278 An 
obligation to arbitrate arises when the consumer signs a contract with a 
business at the time of purchase of goods or services, if that contract 
278
 Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a Contractualist Reply to 
Carrington and Haagen), McGEORGE LAW REVIEW, 196-219, Winter 1998.
Arbitration law is a part of contract law and is subject to contract law defenses.  Much of the law 
governing consumers’ freedom to contract is anti-contract law, but the law governing consumer 
arbitration is an exception to anti-contract consumer law.  The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the 
contract law contained in the FAA to the letter amid allegations that is decisions may be result-oriented 
and intended to conserve judicial resources. This is a definite shift in the law from pre-FAA days when 
arbitration agreements were unenforceable.  The question of genuine assent to arbitrate was present prior 
to the FAA, and there is much discussion about it in light of recent decisions.  The point is made that 
people who sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts are less likely to consider what 
they are really doing compared to those who sign post-dispute agreements.  Professor Ware challenges 
the assertion that consumers are not free to contract with regard to contracts of adhesion, because they 
are free to walk away and not sign the contract.  A case in point which validates Professor Ware’s Theory 
can be found in a comparison between automobile dealerships in Alabama and Georgia.  In Alabama, the 
auto customer is almost always required to sign an arbitration agreement, while customers in adjacent 
Georgia are almost never required to sign an arbitration agreement.  Therefore, the Alabama consumers 
are free to vote with their feet and purchase a car from a Georgia auto dealer rather than sign an 
arbitration agreement.  Professor Ware points out that contracts require mutual manifestations of assent 
and not actual assent.  Therefore, the consumer’s actual assent is not required to form a binding contract.  
Professor Ware points out that while critics of arbitration complain that the process alienates rights, the 
idea behind contracts in general is to create a process where rights can be alienated.
81
contains a pre-dispute binding arbitration clause.279 Recent cases have held 
that unilateral arbitration agreements such as mailing stuffers inserted with 
monthly bills and packing documents inside a product box can also give rise 
to a duty to arbitrate.280 However, not all the federal courts presume the 
customer read the documents and agreed to arbitrate.281  The marriage of 
convenience between law and equity that is binding arbitration appears 
healthy and capable of surviving a very long time.
ACCESS TO JUSTICE WAIVERS AND OTHER ISSUES:
The marriage is not without its critics.  The question of whether a 
party has assented to an arbitration agreement has always been a 
controversial issue with regard to pre-dispute arbitration agreements. The 
United States Constitution in the Seventh Amendment guarantees every 
citizen the right to a trial by jury in matters involving a controversy of over 
$25. The right to a trial by jury is not an inalienable right, because like most 
statutory and constitutional rights, it can be freely, knowingly and 
voluntarily waived. Some scholars have argued that under the restatement of 
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 Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens Door to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers, 71 
NOV FLA. B.J. 8 (1997)
Professor Sternlight questioned the legal reasoning behind the Hill v. Gateway decision from the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  Placing a binding arbitration clause in shipping documents inside a 
product box, and requiring the consumer to read it and return the product or be bound by the arbitration 
agreement seems to call into question the basic principle of contract law.  The transaction for the sale of 
the product did not include an arbitration agreement.  The agreement was added at the time of delivery.
281
 See Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan 2000)
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contracts, the idea of actual mutual assent to binding arbitration is not 
required in order to waive the constitutional right to a jury trial.282 However, 
if a constitutional right is to be waived properly, it must be done so by 
freely, knowingly and voluntarily waiving the right after a full understanding 
of that right.283 It is a stretch to state that a shrink-wrapped arbitration 
agreement contained in the middle of other shipping documents could 
constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to litigate.284
Perhaps this stretched waiver is the price the federal judiciary is willing to 
pay to maintain the benefits of specific performance of arbitration 
agreements.   
The Magnson Moss Warranty Act prohibits product warranty cases 
from being arbitrated.285 It has been the longstanding view of the Federal 
Trade Commission that warranty and arbitration are two words which do not 
belong in the same sentence.286 However, there have been some federal case 
rulings allowing binding arbitration with regard to warranty claims.287
In addition to the statutory battle between the Magnson-Moss Warranty 
Act and the FAA, another statutory face-off looms on the horizon.  The 
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 Jay Folberg, Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements-Can they all be right?,  38 U.S. F. L REV. 1, 2 (2003.
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McCarran-Ferguson Act allows the individual states to regulate insurance 
within their borders.288 The principle behind McCarran-Ferguson is that 
insurance regulation is one of those areas that should be reserved for the 
states, and that the federal government should not intervene in the states’ 
regulation of insurance companies within their borders.289 However, the 
federal cases on this issue indicate that the courts will construe the language 
of McCarran-Ferguson very narrowly in situations where the complainants 
assert McCarran-Ferguson removes the case from the authority of the 
Federal Arbitration Act and places it under the authority of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.290 In the cases decided thus far, the federal courts have 
indicated that the states will be allowed to regulate insurance and will be 
allowed to rule out arbitration clauses in insurance policies, but only if the 
288
 McCarran Ferguson Act 15 U.S.C.A. 1012.
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 American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Harmon 147 F. Supp. 2d 511 (2001)
This was a conspiracy theory case seeking reverse preemption of the FAA.  The case failed to 
reverse pre-empt the FAA under McCarran Ferguson Act, because the party opposing arbitration failed to 
show any specific state statute regulating only insurance that would reverse pre-empt the FAA.  Harmon 
relied upon the informal policies of state officials rather than a state statute, in his effort to reverse pre-
empt the FAA.  The federal court held to reverse pre-empt any federal statute under McCarran-Ferguson, 
three things must be shown:  the federal statute the party is seeking to reverse pre-empt does not regulate 
insurance, a state statute was enacted to regulate insurance and the federal statute operates to invalidate, 
or supercede the state law enacted to regulate insurance.  The informal policy of the Mississippi 
Commissioner of Insurance was insufficient to meet this three-prong test.  The court also held that a 
party cannot obtain a jury trial in contravention of a federal statute merely by demanding one.  This case 
also contained an interesting twist.  The plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement with only one of the 
defendants in the state court action, but the federal court held that plaintiff must arbitrate claims against 
the remaining defendants who were not signatories to the arbitration agreement, because all of their 
claims were intertwined and could not be separated into individual actions.
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state statutes doing this are specifically designed and worded to cover only 
insurance matters, rather than general contract law.291
The essence of the federal decisions in this area thus far have been that 
the states will be able to maintain their rights to control insurance business, 
so long as those rights do not conflict with existing federal law, and that in 
doing so the states have constructed insurance statutes that relate only to 
insurance.292 The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on any of the 
cases involving the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the FAA, but it will be 
interesting to see if the United States Supreme Court maintains the existing 
trend among federal courts to occasionally allow McCarran-Ferguson Act to 
trump the Federal Arbitration Act under certain specified circumstances.
Arbitration is a very actively litigated area of law, and as these cases 
reach the federal court system and eventually the United States Supreme 
Court, attitudes toward binding arbitration within the Judiciary could 
certainly shift in a moment of time.  It is unlikely that any one case, state or 
federal, will resolve once and for all the controversy surrounding specific 
291
 Standard Security Life Insurance Company v. West, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (2000).
This case involved a Missouri state statute designed to regulate insurance (Missouri Rev. Stat. 
435.350).  The Missouri insurance statute rendered an arbitration clause in an insurance contract 
unenforceable.  The insurance company removed the action from a Missouri state court to the Western 
District of Missouri, Central Division, U.S. District Court, seeking preemption of the Missouri statute.  
The federal court held that the Missouri statute specifically regulated only insurance matters, fell within 
the scope of McCarran-Ferguson and was not pre-empted by the FAA.  The federal court held that the 
Missouri law made the insurance company’s arbitration clause unenforceable.
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performance of binding consumer arbitration. As Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion in the case of Allied Bruce 
Terminex v. Dobson,293 this controversy was created by Congress and this 
controversy will have to be resolved by the United States Congress.  The 
courts can do little else other than interpret the intent of Congress from the 
wording of the FAA. 
Justice O’Connor’s astute observation has proven true during the nine 
years since the Terminex decision.  Various interpretations of the effect of 
the FAA on contracts have been rendered across the land, but there appear to 
be few “bright line” tests involved in these decisions.  The underlying theme 
of the federal judiciary in arbitration cases seems to be to compel specific 
performance of arbitration agreements whenever possible.
CONCLUSION: 
Consumer arbitration has a good side.  The cost of this process is much 
less than the average jury trial.  The process does not tie up valuable court 
time or the time and efforts of court personnel.  Therefore, it is an efficient 
marshalling of resources.  In addition to costing less than litigation, 
arbitration brings about binding results quicker than litigation.  The appellate 
process in arbitration is quicker and cheaper than the appellate process in 
293
 Terminex, Supra, FN 116.
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litigation.  Due to the Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, an 
arbitration award is enforceable nationwide and in numerous foreign 
counties.
Consumer arbitration also has a bad side.  The up front costs to 
consumers is generally higher than litigation, even though the overall costs 
are lower.  There are no due process rules in arbitration, and the parties play 
by the rules they agree upon in their contract or mutually agree upon prior to 
arbitration.  The arbitrators may not be independent from the conflict, and 
are sometimes experts in the field in which they arbitrate (labor, 
construction, etc.).  If a party receives a bad result in arbitration, there are 
very few grounds for appeal of the award.  The separability doctrine allows 
an arbitration clause to stand when the contract it is contained in fails, unless 
the protesting party can defeat the validity of the arbitration clause separate 
from the contract.
Arbitration as a dispute resolution process pre-dates jury trials by 
centuries.294  It has provided a procedure for parties to receive a binding 
resolution at less costs than the public dispute resolution system.  Although 
294
 William A. Forsyth, History of Trial By Jury Frederick D. Linnad Company, JERSEY CITY (1875).
No one seems to know just when the jury trial originated.  In England it seems to have been traced to 
the Anglo-Saxon times, but others argue about it was a product of the ancient courts of Teutonic nations.  
Although there is some evidence that the Scandinavians may have enjoyed the benefits of the jury trial as 
early as 750 A.D., the earliest clues pointing to a jury trial originate in ancient Rome.  There is a popular 
legend that the Romans borrowed the jury trial from the ancient Greeks.  
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the process was not enforceable at common law, the FAA married law and 
equity by combining specific performance with arbitration and thereby 
mandating its enforcement.  The future of binding pre-dispute arbitration 
seems secure, due to the favorable view of arbitration by the federal 
judiciary.  Arbitration generally results in lower overall costs to the parties 
and reduced attorneys fees.  Considering the benefits of arbitration the 
attacks leveled against it may seem puzzling to some.
The affordable justice arbitration seems to provide has been questioned 
by scholars concerned about arbitration’s effect on consumer rights.295
Access to justice issues are a serious matter, and some scholars have 
suggested the U.S. Congress take a closer look at the effect of the FAA in 
consumer transactions with a view toward placing some restrictions on the 
use of arbitration in consumer cases.296  A possible solution might be to 
295
 Daniel Woska, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Retail Installment Sales Contracts After the Green Tree 
Financial v. Randolph Decision, 55 Consumer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 107, (2001)
Woska points out that business has no inherent right to arbitrate its disputes with consumers.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court requires consumers to have “compelling” contractual or equitable defenses in order 
to set aside the enforceability of an arbitration agreement.  In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph the 
U.S. Supreme Court placed the burden of proving arbitration costs are rights prohibitive squarely upon 
the shoulders of the consumer.  In other words, the business does not have to prove the cost of arbitration
compared to litigation is equal or even reasonable, but it is the consumer who must prove arbitration 
places them at a disadvantage at law.  The Supreme Court in Randolph acknowledged that the consumer 
might well be forced to bear unreasonable costs, but she did not prove it.  (The Randolph case resulted in 
a plethora of affidavits regarding costs being attached to actions seeking to avoid arbitration.)  Woska 
points out that businesses should be sure the arbitration clause is clear and unambiguous regarding the 
selection of the forum and the costs allocation.
296
 Frederick L. Miller, Arbitration Clauses In Consumer Contracts:  Building Barriers to Consumer 
Protection, 78 MICH. B.J. 302 (1999)
The U.S. Supreme Court took an about face on arbitration clauses in the early 1980’s, and has 
created a liberal policy favoring arbitration applicable in state and federal courts.  The pre-emption of 
state statute designed to ban or restrict arbitration has been the subject of much controversy.  Consumers 
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allow the parties to contract for judicial review in consumer cases.297
Certainly, the problems with binding arbitration are not insurmountable.  
Courts and Congress have found methods to streamline other areas of the 
law in years past, and there is little reason to assume the problems associated 
with consumer cases are incapable of resolution.298
It does not appear that the FAA will be repealed anytime soon.  The 
courts appear to have a vested interest in seeing to it that arbitration 
continues, because it eliminates numerous cases from their over crowded 
dockets.299  The courts will likely continue to address any major problems 
do not create these clauses, but are sometimes forced to pay very high fees to enforce their rights in 
arbitration proceedings.  The consumer’s best chance of avoiding these arguments appears to be in the 
area of unconsicionability.  The courts should realize that fundamental fairness is involved when the 
goals of consumer laws are blocked by barriers created by adhesive predispute arbitration clauses.
297
 David H. Taylor and Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure By Contract:  A Convoluted Confluence of Private 
Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1133-
1145 (2002)
Due to the increasing utilization of pre-litigation agreements the traditional views of contract law 
have been turned upside down.  Some have charged that judges have allowed their own self-interests in 
docket management overcome their concern for the rights of litigants.  Forum selection clauses such as 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses are an about face for the judiciary.  Enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses rests upon judge created interpretations of the FAA.  The federal courts have used the FAA and 
the Commerce Clause to create a body of law that could be described as judicial legislation, and this 
favorable body of law has resulted in the proliferation of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  The courts 
have refused to revisit the legislative history of the FAA and have become pro-arbitration.  The FAA was 
a creature of Congress’ Article III authority, but recently has become the enforcer of the Commerce 
Clause through judicial slight of hand.  The authors urge Congress to take a second look at the current 
mess and endeavor to establish some guidelines for enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
under the FAA
298
 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer Disputes:  Due Process Protocol Protects Consumer 
Rights, DISPUTE RESOLUTION JOURNAL, August 1998
Professor Stipanowich argues for Consumer Due Process Protocol.  The principles of the protocol 
access to information about the information about the processes, independent and impartial neutrals, 
reasonable costs, reasonable hearing locations and proceedings within a reasonable time.
299
 Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine:  The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory 
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1040-1047 (1998)
Federal policy favors arbitral dispute resolution in response to overcrowded dockets, but the extent 
of favoritism granted to arbitration is a major departure from previous practice and the early 
interpretations of the FAA.  The individual state no longer have the power to regulate arbitration 
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that arise with pre-dispute arbitration agreements, but there is little, if any, 
chance of a divorce in the marriage of convenience.  Those who like it and 
those who don’t like it will likely be living with it for some time to come.
Some scholars have observed that when it comes to binding arbitration 
agreements, businesses write the rules in their adhesive contracts, escape the 
legal system and control their own destiny in one feld swoop.300  While this 
statement has some merit, it must be remembered that the FAA was passed 
in response to a litigation system that was costly, hostile to any alternative 
forum and unable to resolve disputes quickly and efficiently.  Since 1925, 
when the FAA was enacted, the legal system has become much more costly, 
time-consuming and frustrating to litigants.  If arbitrators are allowed to 
work with parties and their counsel it is likely that the dispute can be 
reasonably resolved by arbitration in much less time and with less costs than 
in litigation.301
agreements due to the federal policy favoring arbitration.  Adhesive contracts of employment containing 
arbitration clauses are being used to determine employee statutory rights.  The logic behind the federal 
courts interpretation of the FAA rests on two assumptions:  Arbitration is different but not inferior to 
courts, and that parties should be allowed to judge their own best interest.  In Allied Bruce Terminex v. 
Dobson, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the arguments of 20 state attorney’s general against extending 
the reach of the FAA.  In Doctors Associates v. Casarotto the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Mortano’s 
requirement that the notice of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a contract be in bold letters.  States 
are not allowed to police the fairness of an arbitration agreement due to preemption by the FAA.
300
 Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrator Fees:  The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory 
Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. FALL 2003.  Lab. & Emp. L. 
301
 John Wilkinson, Streamlining Arbitration of the Complex Case, DISPUTE RESOLUTION JOURNAL 
August/October 2000.
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 Many of the defenses asserted against arbitration and the criticisms 
leveled at this process stem from viewing the legal system as the only place 
where “true” dispute resolution can take place.302  Binding Arbitration under 
the FAA is not litigation, and attempts to “legalize” it will fail because it is a 
hybrid creature of law and equity.  The process began as an adjunct to the 
system of public dispute resolution in the days of Moses.  The process has 
been altered and changed through the centuries, but now has come full circle 
to its original purpose.  It is an alternative forum to the public dispute 
resolution forum.  
More effort could be made to address the rights’ litigation and access to 
justice issues raised by arbitrations opponents, but the arbitration process 
appears to serve a viable need as an adjunct to the overburdened legal 
system.  Parties are free to contract for this process to be whatever they 
desire it to be, but under the FAA the parties are not free to agree to arbitrate 
and subsequently change their minds.  Arbitration is a time efficient and cost 
effective method of dispute resolution, and as long as parties freely consent 
to its use they should be allowed the benefit of their bargain.
302
 Andrew W. McThinia and Thomas L. Shaffer, Comment: For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 
(1985) This comment was a response to Professor Owen Fiss’ article “Against Settlement” wherein 
Professor Fiss criticized non-traditional methods of dispute resolution.
